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Abstract
Myerson derived a simple and elegant solution to the single-parameter revenue-
maximization problem in his seminal work on optimal auction design assuming the
usual model of quasi-linear utilities. In this paper, we consider a slight generalization
of this usual model—from linear to convex “perceived” payments. This more general
problem does not appear to admit a solution as simple and elegant as Myerson’s.
While some of Myerson’s results extend to our setting, like his payment formula
(suitably adjusted), and the observation that “the mechanism is incentive compatible
only if the allocation rule is monotonic,” others do not. For example, we observe that
the solutions to the Bayesian and the robust (i.e., non-Bayesian) optimal auction design
problems in the convex perceived payment setting do not coincide like they do in the
case of linear payments. We therefore study the two problems in turn.
Myerson finds an optimal robust (and Bayesian) auction by solving pointwise: for
each vector of virtual values, he finds an optimal, ex-post feasible auction; then he
plugs the resulting allocation, which he first verifies is monotonic, into his payment
formula. This strategy relies on a key theorem, that expected revenue equals expected
virtual surplus, which does not hold in our setting. Still, we derive an upper and a
heuristic lower bound on expected revenue in our setting. These bounds are easily
computed pointwise, and yield monotonic allocation rules, so can be supported by
Myerson payments (suitably adjusted). In this way, our bounds yield heuristics that
approximate the optimal robust auction, assuming convex perceived payments.
In tackling the Bayesian problem, we derive a mathematical program that improves
upon the default formulation in that it has only polynomially-many payment variables;
however, it still has exponentially-many allocation variables and ex-post feasibility
constraints. To address this latter issue, we also study the ex-ante relaxation, which
requires only polynomially-many constraints, in all. Specifically, we present a closed-
form solution to a straightforward relaxation of this relaxation. Then, following similar
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logic, we present a closed-form upper bound and a heuristic lower bound on the solution
to the (ex-post) robust problem. As above, the resulting allocation rules can then be
supported by Myerson payment rules, yielding faster heuristics than the greedy ones for
approximating the optimal robust auction. Interestingly, all our closed-form solutions
are rather intuitive: they allocate in proportion to values (or virtual values).
We close with experiments, the final set of which massages the output of one of
the closed-form heuristics for the robust problem into an extremely fast, near-optimal
heuristic solution to the Bayesian optimal auction design problem.
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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Myerson [8] provides a simple and elegant solution to a fundamental
problem in optimal auction design: the single-parameter revenue-maximization problem,
assuming quasi-linear utilities with linear payments: i.e., ui = vixi − pi, where vi > 0 is
i’s private value, xi is his allocation, and pi is his payment to the auctioneer. Generally
speaking, xi and pi are not expressed in the same units; hence, we can think of vi as a
conversion factor, converting units of the good being allocated into units of payment (often,
money). In this paper, we investigate the extent to which Myerson’s observations carry over
to the case of convex “perceived”1 payments. Specifically, we consider utilities of the form
ui = vixi − qi(pi), where qi is a convex function that describes payments that i perceives,
which we distinguish from pi itself (i’s “actual” payment to the auctioneer). Although our
results apply to any convex function qi, as a concrete running example throughout this paper,
we assume qi(pi) = p
2
i , for all bidders i.
Our problem formulation is motivated by a reverse auction setting in which a government
with a fixed budget is offering subsidies (in euros, say) to power companies in exchange for a
supply of renewable energy (in watts, say). We assume the power companies’ utility functions
take this form: u′i = xi−qi(pi)/vi, where xi is some fraction of the total budget in euros, and
1There are two potential payments for bidders to consider in auction problems: those paid to the auc-
tioneer, and those subtracted from vixi in the bidders’ utility functions. In general, these two payments
need not be equated. While we choose to label the former payments (made to the auctioneer) “actual,” and
the latter, “perceived,” we could just as well have taken the perspective of the bidders in our naming, and
referred to the former as “perceived,” and the latter as “actual.”
We also considered referring to perceived payments instead as “costs” instead of payments, which they
rightfully are. But as our results include a payment formula for these costs which closely relates to Myerson’s
original payment formula, it seemed that qualifying the term payment would be more illuminating.
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pi is some deliverable amount of power in watts. As already mentioned, vi is a conversion
factor, in this case from euros to watts. The assumption that qi(pi) is convex reflects the
fact that energy production costs may not be linear; for example, because of diseconomies
of scale, it may be the case that as more energy is produced, further units become more and
more expensive to produce.
Note that multiplying u′i by vi yields a more familiar utility function—that of the forward
auction setting: ui = vixi−qi(pi), with utility measured in units of power, rather than money.
From this point of view, defining perceived payments qi(pi) = p
2
i can be interpreted as an
assumption of risk aversion. A power company might be risk averse because it might be
concerned that it has overestimated its own value, or it might worry that the government
won’t actually deliver on the promised subsidies.
Another problem which also fits into our framework is the problem of allocating a fixed
block of advertising time to retailers during the Superbowl. In this application, an adver-
tiser’s utility is calculated by converting its allocation, in time, into dollars via its private
value, and then subtracting the cost of production: ui = vixi − qi(pi). Here, dividing by
vi yields the utility function u
′
i, which, under the assumption that qi(pi) = p
2
i , again yields
the interpretation that production costs are convex; for example, it may be the case that an
advertisement that is three times as long as another takes nine times as long to produce.
In both of these problems, the auctioneer’s objective is to maximize its total revenue:
Ev [
∑
i pi], where v = (v1, . . . , vn) is distributed according to some commonly known joint
distribution. Specifically, in the energy problem, the government’s objective is to maximize
the amount of power produced, subject to its budget constraint. In the advertising problem,
the television network is seeking to maximize its revenue for selling a fixed block of advertising
time during the Superbowl (or any other television program).
Summary of Results In our setting, in which perceived payments are convex, some of My-
erson’s observations, such as “the mechanism is incentive compatible only if the allocation
rule is monotonic,” continue to hold. So does his payment formula (suitably adjusted).
But others do not. The solutions to the robust (i.e., non-Bayesian) and Bayesian optimal
auction design problems (in the latter, incentive compatibility and individual rationality need
only hold in expectation) do not coincide in our setting like they do in the linear-payment
setting. Moreover, bidder surplus is no longer an upper bound on revenue, and expected
revenue no longer equals expected virtual surplus.
We do show, however, that revenue can be upper bounded by a quantity we call pseudo-
surplus, and that expected revenue can be heuristically lower bounded by expected virtual
surplus. Because it is straightforward to compute these bounds (i.e., greedy algorithms
suffice), we propose the following heuristic procedure for the robust optimal auction design
problem: 1. solve greedily for a feasible allocation that achieves the upper or heuristic lower
bound, and 2. plug that allocation into Myerson’s payment formula to ensure incentive
compatibility and individual rationality. We show experimentally that the performance of
these heuristics can be near-optimal, and that they are faster than solving the corresponding
revenue-maximizing mathematical programs using standard solvers.
Our heuristic that lower bounds the solution to the robust optimal auction design problem
also heuristically lower bounds the Bayesian problem, because in the latter the constraints
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are strictly weaker. Regardless, we prove a theorem for the Bayesian setting that allows us
to simplify the revenue-maximizing mathematical program from one that has exponentially-
many payment variables to one that has only polynomially-many.
Even so, a Bayesian optimal auction still involves exponentially-many allocation variables
and requires satisfying exponentially-many ex-post feasibility constraints. To address this
latter concern, we also study the ex-ante relaxation, which requires only polynomially-many
constraints, in all. Specifically, we present a closed-form solution to a straightforward re-
laxation of this relaxation, which yields a closed-form upper bound on the ex-ante Bayesian
problem. Intuitively, this solution allocates in proportion to virtual values.
Lastly, following similar logic, we present a closed-form upper bound and a heuristic
lower bound on the solution to the (ex-post) robust problem. (Interestingly, these closed-
form solutions allocate in proportion to values.) An analog of the aforementioned greedy
heuristics then applies, in which the closed-form allocation rule is supported by Myerson
payment rules, yielding closed-form heuristics that approximate the optimal robust auction.
In our final set of experiments, we massage the output of one of these closed-form heuristics
for the robust problem using the payment variables in the simpler formulation of the Bayesian
problem to arrive at a near-optimal heuristic solution to the Bayesian problem, which is faster
in practice than standard solvers (and faster than our greedy heuristic).
Related Work Vickery [11] showed that auctions in which the highest bidder wins and pays
the second-highest bid incentivizes bidders to bid truthfully. Myerson [8] showed that in the
single-parameter setting, with the usual utility function involving linear payments, expected
revenue is maximized by a Vickrey auction with reserve prices. Our setting is not captured
by Myerson’s classic characterization because payments in our model are convex.
The technical difficulties that arise in our setting are similar in spirit to the ones faced
by Pai and Vohra [9] when designing optimal auctions for budget-constrained bidders. If
qi(pi)/vi = p
k
i for some k  0, then ui = vixi − pki ≥ 0 when (vixi)1/k ≥ pi. Additionally,
if pi ever exceeds (vixi)
1/k, utility quickly approaches −∞. Therefore, we can interpret a
utility function with convex perceived payments as a continuous approximation of that of a
budget-limited agent whose utility is −∞ whenever her payment exceeds her budget.
Our model also has strong connections with the literature on optimal auctions for risk-
averse buyers (see Maskin and Riley [7]), since the fact that utility is a concave function in
terms of payments can be seen as a form of risk aversion. In fact, our model is captured
by their generic formulation if the good to be allocated is indivisible. Optimal auctions for
risk-averse bidders are notoriously hard to characterize in theory. Developing and testing
theoretically-inspired heuristics may prove to be a fruitful alternative.
The idea of translating a reverse auction into a direct auction by multiplying utility by
the private parameter vi was previously proposed in the literature on optimal contests (see,
for example, Chawla, et al. [3] or DiPalantino and Vojnovic [4]).
Procuring services subject to a budget constraint is also the subject of the literature on
budget-feasible mechanisms initiated by Singer [10]. However, in this literature, the service
of each seller is fixed and the utility of the buyer is a combinatorial function of the set of
sellers the buyer picks. In our setting, each seller can produce a different level of service
(i.e., amount of energy) by incurring a different cost, so the buyer picks not only a set of
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sellers, but a level of service that each seller should provide as well. This renders the two
procurement models incomparable.
Our model is also related to the parameterized supply bidding game of Johari and Tsit-
siklis [6], where firms play a game in which they submit a single-parameter family of supply
functions. There, the amount each firm is asked to produce is decided via a non-truthful
mechanism, and efficiency at equilibrium is analyzed. Here, we consider the design of truth-
ful mechanisms and we study a different objective, but we also restrict attention to single-
parameter families of supply functions qi(pi).
In principle, some of our problem formulations can be solved using Border’s character-
ization of interim feasible outcomes [2] and an ellipsoid type algorithm with a separation
oracle. However, such mechanisms tend to be computationally expensive. Here, we seek fast
allocation heuristics with potential economic justification, such as virtual-value-based max-
imizations. Virtual-value-maximizing approximations to optimal auction design were also
studied recently by Alaei, et al. [1] in the context of multi-dimensional mechanism design,
and from a worst-case point of view. Proving worst-case approximation guarantees for our
heuristics is an interesting future direction.
We close this discussion of related work by pointing out that the case of a finitely divisible
good, such as euros or seconds, which motivates the current work, lies along a continuum
between an indivisible and an infinitely divisible good. An optimal solution that is subject
to a discretization constraint (i.e., finitely divisible) can differ from a corresponding optimal
continuous solution (i.e., infinitely divisible) by at most a discretization term. For a budget
that is small relative to this discretization factor, the magniture of the error is large, so
the budget behaves more like an indivisible good; but as a budget increases relative to the
discretization factor, the magnitude of the error decreases, so the budget behaves more like
an infinitely divisible good.
2 Our Model
Consider a reverse auction with n bidders. Each bidder i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} has a private
type 0 ≤ vi ∈ Ti that is independently drawn from some distribution Fi. Let T = T1×· · ·×Tn
be the set of all possible type vectors, and let F = F1 × · · · × Fn be the distribution over
type vectors v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ T. Let b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Rn be a vector of bids, where
the ith entry bi is bidder i’s bid. For y ∈ {b ,v}, we use the notation y = (yi,y−i),
where y−i = (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yn). Similarly, we use the notation T−i, where T−i =
T1 × · · · × Ti−i × Ti+1 × · · · × Tn, and F−i, where F−i = F1 × · · · × Fi−i × Fi+1 × · · · × Fn.
Given vector of reports b , a mechanism produces an allocation rule x(b) ∈ [0, 1]n that
typically depends only on those reports, together with a payment rule p(b ,x) ∈ Rn, which,
in general, can depend on both the reports and the allocation rule. Where it is clear from
context, we suppress dependence of the payment rule on x , and write only p(b). We also
do the same for payment terms pi(b ,x), which comprise payment rule p(b), and refer to
bidder i’s payment as pi(bi,b−i).
We define bidder i’s utility function as u′i(bi,b−i) = xi(bi,b−i)−Qi(pi(bi,b−i), vi), where
vi is private information, known only to bidder i, and Qi(pi, vi) is a function that con-
verts payments, in units such as energy, to the units of the good being allocated, such as
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euros. If we assume Qi(pi(bi,b−i), vi) = qi(pi(bi,b−i))/vi, then maximizing the function
viu
′
i(bi,b−i) = vixi(bi,b−i) − qi(pi(bi,b−i)) also maximizes ui(bi,b−i) = viu′i(bi,b−i). Con-
sequently, hereafter we assume forward utility functions of this form:
ui(bi,b−i) = vixi(bi,b−i)− qi(pi(bi,b−i)). (1)
The shape of the utility function varies with the choice of qi: for example, it can be linear if
we choose qi to be the identity function, or concave if we choose qi(pi(bi,b−i)) = (pi(bi,b−i))2.
Figures 1 and 2 plot sample utility functions for these two choices of qi.
For readability, we usually write qi(bi,b−i) instead of qi(pi(bi,b−i)). Furthermore, we
refer to the rule q(b) ∈ Rn as the perceived payment rule, as these are payments the
bidders impose upon themselves. Likewise, we think of p(b) as an actual payment rule,
as these are payments the bidders actually pay to the auctioneer. (But we usually omit the
descriptor “actual,” as what it modifies is the actual payment rule!)
With this general utility function in mind, we proceed to formulate the optimal auction
design problem: we seek the revenue-maximizing, ex-post feasible auction in which it is
optimal for bidders to bid truthfully, and it is rational for them to participate. Once again,
Myerson solved this problem in the quasi-linear case, assuming linear payments.
3
Payment
ui(vi;v!i) = vixi(vi;v!i)! pi(vi;v!i), vi = 3
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Figure 1: Linear quasi-linear utility as a function of allocation and linear payments is
shown, for ui(vi,v−i) = vixi(vi,v−i) − pi(vi,v−i), where vi = 3. For a fixed allocation
xi(vi,v−i), utility scales linearly with pi(vi,v−i), and for a fixed payment pi(vi,v−i), utility
scales linearly with x(vi,v−i). Utility is non-negative when vixi(vi,v−i) ≥ pi(vi,v−i), so
individual rationality dictates that pi(vi,v−i) can be at most 3.
2.1 Constraints
In this section, we formalize the constraints we will impose on an optimal auction design.
Because we restrict our attention to incentive compatible auctions, where it is optimal to
7
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Figure 2: Concave quasi-linear utility as a function of allocation and convex perceived
payments is shown, for ui(vi,v−i) = vixi(vi,v−i) − (pi(vi,v−i))2, where vi = 3. For
a fixed allocation xi(vi,v−i), utility scales quadratically with pi(vi,v−i), and for a fixed
payment pi(vi,v−i), utility scales linearly with xi(vi,v−i). Utility is non-negative when√
vixi(vi,v−i) ≥ pi(vi,v−i), so individual rationality dictates that pi(vi,v−i) can be at most√
3.
bid truthfully, we write qi(vi,v−i) instead of qi(bi,b−i). (As usual, the variables qi(vi,v−i)
comprise the perceived payment rule q(v) ∈ Rn.)
A mechanism is called incentive compatible (IC) if each bidder maximizes her utility
by reporting bids bi that are equal to values vi: ∀i ∈ N , ∀vi, wi ∈ Ti, and ∀v−i ∈ T−i,
vixi(vi,v−i)− qi(vi,v−i) ≥ vixi(wi,v−i)− qi(wi,v−i). (2)
Individual rationality (IR) ensures that bidders have non-negative utilities: ∀i ∈ N ,
∀vi ∈ Ti, and ∀v−i ∈ T−i,
vixi(vi,v−i)− qi(vi,v−i) ≥ 0. (3)
Next, we define IC and IR in expectation (with respect to F−i). To do so, we introduce
interim allocation and interim perceived payment variables, respectively: xˆi(vi) ≡
xˆi(vi, ·) = Ev−i [xi(vi,v−i)] and qˆi(vi) ≡ qˆi(vi, ·) = Ev−i [qi(vi,v−i)]. These variables comprise
the interim allocation and perceived payment rules, xˆ(v) ∈ [0, 1]n and qˆ(v) ∈ Rn.
We call a mechanism Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if utility is maximized by
truthful reports in expectation: ∀i ∈ N and ∀vi, wi ∈ Ti,
vixˆi(vi)− qˆi(vi) ≥ vixˆi(wi)− qˆi(wi). (4)
Bayesian individual rationality (BIR) insists on non-negative utilities in expectation:
∀i ∈ N and ∀vi ∈ Ti,
vixˆi(vi)− qˆi(vi) ≥ 0. (5)
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We say a mechanism is ex-post feasible (XP) if it never overallocates: ∀v ∈ T,
n∑
i=1
xi(vi,v−i) ≤ 1. (6)
Ex-ante feasibility (XA) is satisfied if, in expectation, the mechanism does not over-
allocate:
E
v
[
n∑
i=1
xi(v)
]
≤ 1. (7)
Finally, we require that 0 ≤ xi(vi,v−i), xˆi(vi) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀vi ∈ Ti and ∀v−i ∈ T−i.
2.2 Revenue Maximization
The robust revenue-maximization problem (RRM) is to maximize total expected pay-
ments (i.e., Ev [
∑n
i=1 pi(vi,v−i)]), subject to IR, IC, and ex-post feasibility. RRM is expressed
as a mathematical program in Section C.1.1. A typical relaxation of this problem insists on
ex-ante feasibility only.
Likewise, the Bayesian revenue-maximization problem (BRM) is to maximize total
expected payments subject to BIR, BIC, and ex-post feasibility (or ex-ante feasibility). BRM
with ex-post feasibility is expressed as a mathematical program in Section C.2.1. BRM with
ex-ante feasibility is expressed as a mathematical program in Section C.3.1.
In both RRM and BRM, there are exponentially-many ex-post feasibility constraints,
and exponentially-many allocation and payment variables. However, revenue maximization
subject to BIC and BIR but only ex-ante feasibility involves only one feasibility constraint
and polynomially-many interim allocation and payment variables.
In this paper, we assume qi(pi(vi,v−i)) = (pi(vi,v−i))2 (or qi = p2i , for short). This
choice of perceived payments yields quadratic constraints. While small instances of the
quadratic programs that express BRM and RRM can be solved by standard mathematical
programming solvers, this approach does not scale. We are interested in finding scalable
algorithms that produce approximately-optimal solutions to these problems.
3 Myerson’s Payment Formula
We start by providing a straightforward adaptation of Myerson’s payment formula [8] to the
case where the utilities are of the concave form of interest.
For consistency with our implementations,2 we describe our contributions under the as-
sumption that type distributions are discrete, but our theoretical results are in no way
contingent on this assumption. Specifically, we assume the distribution of values is drawn
from the discrete type space Ti = {zi,k : 1 ≤ k ≤Mi}, of cardinality Mi, where zi,j < zi,k for
j < k, and we let zi,Mi+1 = zi,Mi . Furthermore, let fi(vi) be the probability of vi ∈ Ti, let
f(v) be the probability of v ∈ T, and let f−i(v−i) be the probability of v−i ∈ T−i.
Myerson’s payment theorem, which takes as a starting point the bidders’ utility functions
(i.e., Equation (1)), applies immediately to the perceived payment rules q and qˆ :
2True to our profession—computer science—we have implemented all mechanisms discussed in this paper.
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Theorem 3.1. Assume bidders’ utilities take the form of Equation (1). A mechanism is IC
and IR iff for each bidder i ∈ N :
• the allocation rule x is monotone, i.e., ∀vi ≥ wi ∈ Ti and ∀v−i ∈ T−i, xi(vi,v−i) ≥
xi(wi,v−i); and
• the perceived payment rule q is given by: ∀zi,` ∈ Ti and ∀v−i ∈ T−i,
qi(zi,`,v−i) = zi,`xi(zi,`,v−i)−
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xi(zi,j,v−i) (8)
where qi(0,v−i) = 0.
Likewise, in the Bayesian setting, a mechanism is BIC and BIR iff for each bidder i ∈ N :
• the allocation rule xˆ is monotone, i.e., ∀vi ≥ wi ∈ Ti, xˆi(vi) ≥ xˆi(wi); and
• the perceived payment rule qˆ is given by: ∀zi,` ∈ Ti,
qˆi(zi,`) = zi,`xˆi(zi,`)−
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xˆi(zi,j) (9)
where qˆi(0) = 0.
Remark 3.2. The monotonicity of the allocation rule ensures that the perceived payment
rule is also monotonic. Specifically, the perceived payment associated with a bidder of type
zi,`+1 is at least as great as the perceived payment associated with a bidder of type zi,`:
qi(zi,`+1,v−i) = zi,`+1xi(zi,`+1,v−i)−
∑`
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xi(zi,j,v−i)
= zi,`+1 (xi(zi,`+1,v−i)− xi(zi,`,v−i)) + zi,`xi(zi,`,v−i)−
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xi(zi,j,v−i)
= zi,`+1 (xi(zi,`+1,v−i)− xi(zi,`,v−i)) + qi(zi,`,v−i)
≥ qi(zi,`,v−i).
But as our goal is to maximize revenue, we are interested not in the bidders’ perceived
payments, but rather in the actual payments to the auctioneer, namely p(v), pˆ(v) ∈ Rn, the
latter of which is comprised of variables pˆi(vi) ≡ pˆi(vi, ·) = Ev−i [pi(vi,v−i)]. In the robust
problem, the generalization is straightforward: since qi(zi,`,v−i) = (pi(zi,`,v−i))2, it follows
that pi(zi,`,v−i) is simply the square root of qi(zi,`,v−i).
In the Bayesian problem, however, qˆi(zi,`) need not equal (pˆi(zi,`))
2, because qˆi(zi,`) =
Ev−i [qi(zi,`,v−i)] = Ev−i [(pi(zi,`,v−i))2] 6=
(
Ev−i [pi(zi,`,v−i)]
)2 ≡ (pˆi(zi,`))2. Nonetheless,
in Section 6, we successfully derive an interim payment function hi(zi,`) for which qˆi(zi,`) =
(hi(zi,`))
2, so that hi(zi,`) is the square root of qˆi(zi,`).
3
3In Algorithms 7) and 10, the payment rule h(v) ∈ Rn, is comprised of variables hi(vi).
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Corollary 3.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, for qi(zi,`,v−i) = (pi(zi,`,v−i))2,
pi(zi,`,v−i) =
√√√√zi,`xi(zi,`,v−i)− `−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xi(zij,v−i). (10)
Likewise, given an interim payment function hi : Ti → R such that qˆi(zi,`) = (hi(zi,`))2,
then
hi(zi,`) =
√√√√zi,`xˆi(zi,`)− `−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xˆi(zi,j). (11)
Myerson’s payment formula is immensely powerful. It gives rise to a procedure for optimal
auction design that at first glance borders on the miraculous. The procedure is thus: First,
solve for an allocation rule that optimizes your objective (surplus, revenue, what have you),
subject only to ex-post feasibility. Second, check for monotonicity. If the optimal allocation
rule is indeed monotonic, then you are home free; you need only plug that allocation rule
into Myerson’s payment formula and you will have imposed incentive compatibility and
individual rationality without sacrificing one ounce of optimality!. In other words, given
a monotone allocation rule, IC and IR are yours for the taking. That is the essence of
Myerson’s approach, and something we exploit heavily in this work.
4 Robust vs. Bayesian Optimal Auctions
Another of the more surprising facts that Myerson discovered about the optimal auction
design problem (assuming linear perceived payments) is that the total expected revenue in
the robust and Bayesian problems are equivalent. It is clear that the value of a solution
to BRM must be at least that of RRM, since the objectives are the same while BRM’s
constraints are weaker. It is the other direction, namely that the value of a solution to BRM
never exceeds that of RRM, which is surprising. This latter relies on the assumption that
perceived payments, and hence utilities, are linear, and therefore does not hold in our setting
with convex perceived payments, and hence concave utilities, which we now proceed to show
via counterexample.
4.1 Robust Revenue 6= Bayesian Revenue
We begin our analysis of BRM vs. RRM with convex perceived payments by demonstrating
via example that solutions to BRM can strictly exceed those of RRM when qi = p
2
i . There-
fore, an optimal solution to RRM does not generally yield an optimal solution to BRM,
although it does yield an immediate lower bound.
Example 4.1. Suppose we have n = 2 symmetric bidders, where for each bidder i ∈ N =
{1, 2}, Ti = {0, 100}, and for each value vi ∈ Ti, fi(vi) = 1/2.
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RRM Our goal is to maximize revenue, while satisfying IC, IR, and the ex-post feasibility
constraints. This mathematical program appears in Section C.1.1.
We know from IR that qi(vi,v−i) is upper-bounded by vixi(vi,v−i). So when vi = 0,
qi(vi,v−i) ≤ 0. So we can set xi(vi,v−i) = 0, for all v−i ∈ T−i.
When one bidder, say i, has type 100, and the other bidder has type 0, we maximize
total payments by setting xi(100, 0) = 1.
When both bidders have type 100, by Equation (10), pi(100, 100) =
√
100xi(100, 100).
Therefore, total payments are maximized when xi(100, 100) = 1/2.
Thus, in the robust problem, the following allocation is optimal:
x1(0, 0) = 0 x2(0, 0) = 0
x1(100, 0) = 1 x2(100, 0) = 0
x1(0, 100) = 0 x2(0, 100) = 1
x1(100, 100) = 1/2 x2(100, 100) = 1/2.
Computing payments according to Equation (10) yields:
p1(0, 0) = 0 p2(0, 0) = 0
p1(100, 0) = 10 p2(100, 0) = 0
p1(0, 100) = 0 p2(0, 100) = 10
p1(100, 100) =
√
50 p2(100, 100) =
√
50.
Therefore, the total expected revenue in the robust problem is:
n∑
i=1
∑
v
f(v)pi(vi,v−i) = 2
∑
v
f(v)pi(vi,v−i)
= 2
(
1
4
(
0 + 10 + 0 +
√
50
))
= 5
(
1 +
√
2
2
)
.
BRM Our goal is to maximize revenue, while satisfying BIC, BIR and the ex-post feasibility
constraints. This mathematical program appears in Section C.2.1.
We know from BIR that qˆi(vi) is upper-bounded by vixˆi(vi). So when vi = 0, qˆi(vi) ≤ 0.
So we can set xˆi(vi) = 0, which implies that xi(0,v−i) = 0, for all v−i ∈ T−i. Additionally,
since qˆi(0) = Ev−i
[
(pi(0,v−i))
2], this also means that pi(0,v−i) = 0, for all v−i ∈ T−i.
When vi = 100, we want to maximize xˆi(vi) so that we can maximize qˆi(vi), as this will
maximize the payments the auctioneer collects when a bidder has type 100. For bidder 1:
xˆ1(100) = f−1(0)x1(100, 0) + f−1(100)x1(100, 100)
=
1
2
(x1(100, 0) + x1(100, 100)) .
12
4.1 Robust Revenue 6= Bayesian Revenue4 ROBUST VS. BAYESIAN OPTIMAL AUCTIONS
We can set x1(100, 0) to 1, which leaves only x1(100, 100) to be determined. Since the setting
is symmetric, we can also set x2(0, 100) = 1, leaving x2(100, 100) also to be determined.
Rewriting the BIR constraints using payment terms explicitly, we have
100
(
1
2
x1(100, 0) +
1
2
x1(100, 100)
)
≥ 1
2
(
(p1(100, 0))
2 + (p1(100, 100))
2)
100
(
1
2
x2(0, 100) +
1
2
x2(100, 100)
)
≥ 1
2
(
(p2(0, 100))
2 + (p2(100, 100))
2)
Equivalently,
100
(
1
2
+
1
2
x1(100, 100)
)
≥ 1
2
(
(p1(100, 0))
2 + (p1(100, 100))
2)
100
(
1
2
+
1
2
(1− x1(100, 100))
)
≥ 1
2
(
(p2(0, 100))
2 + (p2(100, 100))
2)
Combining the inequalities yields
150 ≥ 1
2
(
(p1(100, 0))
2 + (p1(100, 100))
2 + (p2(0, 100))
2 + (p2(100, 100))
2
)
Subject to this constraint, we can maximize total payments,
p1(100, 0) + p1(100, 100) + p2(0, 100) + p2(100, 100),
by equating each of the four payment terms, so that pi(100,v−i) = 5
√
3.
In summary, the following payment rule maximizes revenue:
pi(0,v−i) = 0, ∀i ∈ N,∀v−i ∈ T−i
pi(100,v−i) = 5
√
3, ∀i ∈ N,∀v−i ∈ T−i.
This payment rule implies a symmetric allocation in which x1(100, 0) = x2(0, 100) =
1
2
.
Therefore, this BRM problem can be solved using the same allocation rule as the corre-
sponding RRM problem:
x1(0, 0) = 0 x2(0, 0) = 0
x1(100, 0) = 1 x2(100, 0) = 0
x1(0, 100) = 0 x2(0, 100) = 1
x1(100, 100) = 1/2 x2(100, 100) = 1/2.
Furthermore, the interim allocation rule is given by:
xˆ1(0) = 0 xˆ2(0) = 0
xˆ1(100) =
3
4
xˆ2(100) =
3
4
.
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From this interim allocation rule, we derive the interim payment rule according to Equa-
tion (11):
hi(0) =
√
0 xˆi(0) = 0
hi(100) =
√
100 xˆi(100)− (100− 0) xˆi(0) = 5
√
3.
Observe that hi(0) = pi(0,v−i) = Ev−i [pi(0,v−i)] = pˆi(0), for all v−i ∈ T−i; likewise for 100.
Finally, the total expected revenue in the Bayesian problem (which we can compute using
either the hi(vi)
′s or the pi(vi,v−i)′s) is:
n∑
i=1
∑
vi∈Ti
fi(vi)hi(vi) = 2
∑
vi∈Ti
fi(vi)hi(vi)
= 2
(
1
2
(
0 + 5
√
3
))
= 5
√
3.
Since
√
3 ≈ 1.732 > 1.707 ≈ (1 +√2/2), it follows that 5√3 > 5(1 +√2/2). Thus, we
conclude that the value of the optimal solution to a Bayesian problem can exceed the value
of the optimal solution to the corresponding robust problem, assuming convex perceived
payments, and hence concave utilities.
Remark 4.2. More generally, with two types, 0 and v, the total expected robust revenue
is 1
2
(√
v +
√
v
2
)
, while the total expected Bayesian revenue is
√
3
2
√
v, making BRM greater
than RRM by a factor of
√
3
2
√
v
1
2
(√
v +
√
v
2
) = √6√
2 + 1
≈ 1.015.
An open question at present is how bad this ratio becomes as the number of types increases.
Remark 4.3. Until now, we have not discussed the possibility of randomized auctions. Ran-
domization is not necessary in the linear-payment setting because there always exists an
optimal allocation rule that is integral. But in our examples, the optimal allocation rule
is fractional. While a fractional allocation rule does not pose a problem in the case of
an infinitely divisible good, in the case of an indivisible good, strictly more revenue can
be obtained by interpreting the allocations x(v) as probabilities, and then allocating that
one good at random based on these probabilities: i.e., randomization adds power assuming
convex perceived payments.
Likewise, in our case—the case of a finitely divisible good (i.e., a budget)—randomization
again adds power, assuming convex perceived payments. However, that power decreases as
the discretization factor decreases with respect to the budget. Specifically, for a discretization
factor of ∆B (say e0.01), given a budget of B (say 1 million euro), the potential gain due to
randomization is at most O(∆B/B) (which is e10−8, in our example). (We prove this claim
in Appendix A.)
Having established that these two problems—BRM and RRM—are distinct, we proceed
to study them in turn (see Sections 5 and 6). But first a word about surplus.
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4.2 Robust Pseudo-surplus 6= Bayesian Pseudo-surplus
In addition to noting the equivalence of revenue in the robust and Bayesian (linear perceived
payment) problems, Myerson also noted the equivalence of bidder surplus in these two prob-
lems. Bidder surplus is a quantity of interest in the usual setting with linear perceived
payments, even when studying revenue maximization, because bidder surplus upper bounds
revenue. In our convex perceived payment setting, however, bidder surplus does not upper
bound revenue (see Example 5.1). Nonetheless, we introduce a quantity we call pseudo-
surplus, which does upper bound revenue (in both the robust and the Bayesian problems).
When perceived payments are linear, so that qi = pi, IR implies that vixi(vi,v−i) ≥
pi(vi,v−i). The quantity on the left-hand side of this inequality is called bidder i’s surplus.
Taking expectations and summing over all bidders yields expected bidder surplus as an upper
bound on expected revenue:
n∑
i=1
E
v
[vixi(vi,v−i)] ≥
n∑
i=1
E
v
[pi(vi,v−i)] . (12)
When perceived payments are quadratic, so that qi = p
2
i , IR implies that
√
vixi(vi,v−i) ≥
pi(vi,v−i). We call the quantity on the left-hand side of this inequality bidder i’s (robust)
pseudo-surplus. After taking expectations and summing over all bidders, as above, we find
that expected revenue is upper bounded by expected bidder pseudo-surplus:
n∑
i=1
E
v
[√
vixi(vi,v−i)
]
≥
n∑
i=1
E
v
[pi(vi,v−i)] . (13)
Likewise, in the Bayesian problem, by BIR, ∀i ∈ N and ∀vi ∈ Ti, vixˆi(vi) ≥ qˆi(vi).
When perceived payments are quadratic, if there exists an interim payment function hi :
Ti → R such that qˆi(vi) = (hi(vi))2, as in Corollary 3.3, then vixˆi(vi) ≥ (hi(vi))2, so that√
vixˆi(vi) ≥ hi(vi). We call the quantity on the left-hand side of this inequality bidder i’s
Bayesian pseudo-surplus. After taking expectations and summing over all bidders, as
usual, we find that expected revenue is upper-bounded by expected bidder Bayesian pseudo-
surplus:
n∑
i=1
E
vi
[√
vixˆi(vi)
]
≥
n∑
i=1
E
vi
[hi(vi)] . (14)
Remark 4.4. Bayesian pseudo-surplus is at least as great as robust pseudo-surplus:
E
vi
[√
vixˆi(vi)
]
= E
vi
[√
vi E
v−i
[xi(vi,v−i)]
]
≥ E
vi
[
E
v−i
[√
vixi(vi,v−i)
]]
= E
v
[√
vixi(vi,v−i)
]
.
The following example, which builds on Example 4.1, shows that the pseudo-surplus
bounds (Equations (13) and (14)) are tight, meaning revenue can equal pseudo-surplus in
both the robust and Bayesian problem settings.
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Example 4.5. We continue using the framework of Example 4.1.
In the robust problem, revenue equals pseudo-surplus:
2∑
i=1
E
v
[√
vixi(vi,v−i)
]
= 2
∑
v∈T
f(v)
[√
v1x1(v1,v−1)
]
= 2
(
1
4
(√
0x1(0, 0) +
√
0x1(0, 100) +
√
100x1(100, 0) +
√
100x1(100, 100)
))
= 2
(
1
4
(√
0 · 0 +
√
0 · 0 +
√
100 · 1 +
√
100 · 1
2
))
=
5
2
(
2 +
√
2
)
.
Similarly, in the Bayesian problem, revenue equals pseudo-surplus:
2∑
i=1
E
vi
[√
vixˆi(vi)
]
= 2
∑
v1∈T1
f1(v1)
√
v1xˆ1(v1)
= 2
(
1
2
(√
0 xˆ1(0) +
√
100 xˆ1(100)
))
= 2
(
1
2
(√
0 · 0 +
√
100 · 3
4
))
= 5
√
3.
In Example 4.1, revenue in the Bayesian problem exceeds revenue in the robust problem.
But in Example 4.5, revenue equals pseudo-surplus in both the robust and Bayesian prob-
lems. Therefore, Bayesian pseudo-surplus exceeds robust pseudo-surplus. In other words,
while pseudo-surplus in a Bayesian problem is always at least that of pseudo-surplus in the
corresponding robust problem (potentially greater objective function; weaker constraints),
Bayesian pseudo-surplus can strictly exceed robust pseudo-surplus.
In summary, both revenue and pseudo-surplus in the Bayesian and the corresponding
robust problems are not generally equal in the convex perceived payment setting as they are
in the linear perceived payment setting. (In the linear perceived payment setting, because of
linearity, there is no distinction between Bayesian and robust surplus; there is only surplus.)
Consequently, we are unable to proceed as Myerson did, and solve for an optimal auction in
the robust problem formulation as a means of finding an optimal auction in the corresponding
Bayesian setting. Instead, we are forced to address these two problems separately.
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5 Robust Revenue Maximization
The first problem we tackle is robust revenue maximization (RRM). Recall the power of
Myerson’s payment characterization (Theorem 3.1): the problem of optimal auction design
can be reduced to the problem of finding an optimal feasible allocation, where feasible here
means only ex-post feasible; then if the resulting allocation is monotonic, IC and IR can be
had for free, by assigning the appropriate payments, thereby resulting in an optimal auction.
This is precisely the approach we take here.
We have already established an upper bound on revenue (namely, pseudo-surplus). The
present exercise will lead us to an algorithm for finding an ex-post feasible allocation that
optimizes that upper bound, which, when saddled with Myerson payment rule, yields a
heuristic procedure that approximates RRM from above. Likewise, this exercise will also
lead us to a heuristic lower bound, along with an analogous algorithm for computing an ex-
post feasible allocation that optimizes that heuristic lower bound, which, along with Myerson
payment rule, yields a heuristic procedure that approximates RRM from below.
In Appendix B, we also derive an alternative, as-of-yet non-operational, (tight) upper
bound on expected revenue.
5.1 Pseudo-Surplus Maximization
Although Myerson ultimately applied his payment formula to compute payments in a revenue-
maximizing auction, his formula applies equally well to computing payments in a surplus-
maximizing auction. While maximizing surplus is not the eventual goal of this work (recall
our example in which the government wished to maximize power: i.e., revenue), we can
nonetheless use Myerson’s approach to find a pseudo-surplus-maximizing auction in our set-
ting, in a manner analogous to finding a surplus-maximizing auction in the usual quasi-linear
setting with linear perceived payments.
Our present objective is surplus, in the usual quasi-linear setting. Observe the following:
max
x
E
v
[
n∑
i=1
vi xi(vi,v−i)
]
= E
v
[
max
x (v )
n∑
i=1
vi xi(vi,v−i)
]
. (15)
This equality holds because x(v) is independent of any other v′ 6= v ∈ T. Consequently,
surplus (the left-hand side) can be maximized by proceeding pointwise (the right-hand
side), in which an optimal allocation is determined for each v in turn.
Recall that Myerson reduced the problem of optimal auction design to the problem of
finding an optimal ex-post feasible allocation (assuming monotonicity). It is straightforward
to enforce ex-post feasibility and simultaneously maximize the objective function pointwise:
given v , simply allocate to i∗ ∈ arg maxi{ci}, breaking ties randomly. (Pseudocode for this
pointwise approach is presented in Algorithm 1.4) Since the resulting allocation is monotone
4In the case of an indivisible good, this pseudocode can be interpreted as defining a randomized mechanism
that allocates uniformly at random to exactly one of the highest bidders. In the case of an infinitely divisible
good, fractionally, in proportion to the number of bidders tied for the highest bid. In the case of interest,
namely a finitely divisible budget B, any error in a discrete approximation as compared to the continuous
(i.e., infinitely divisible) case, assuming discretization factor ∆B , is upper-bounded by O(|M |∆B/B).
17
5.1 Pseudo-Surplus Maximization 5 ROBUST REVENUE MAXIMIZATION
(higher values are allocated more), it can be plugged in to Myerson’s payment rule to arrive
at an IC, IR, ex-post feasible surplus-maximizing auction (see Algorithm 2). Doing so yields
Vickrey’s famous second-price auction [11].
Algorithm 1 Pointwise Maximization
1: procedure Pointwise Maximization(c)
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: xi(ci, c−i)← 0
4: end for
5: if any of the ci’s are positive then
6: M ← arg maxi {ci}
7: for all i∗ ∈M do
8: xi∗(ci∗ , c−i∗)← 1/|M |
9: end for
10: end if
11: return x(c)
12: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Surplus Maximizer
1: for all v ∈ T do
2: x(v)← Pointwise Maximization(v)
3: end for
4: W ← Ev [
∑n
i=1 vixi(vi,v−i)] . Total expected surplus
5: Calculate the payment rule p using Equation (8) with q = p
6: return W , x , p
Like surplus, pseudo-surplus can be maximized pointwise, because once again
max
x
E
v
[
n∑
i=1
√
vi xi(vi,v−i)
]
= E
v
[
max
x (v )
n∑
i=1
√
vi xi(vi,v−i)
]
. (16)
Given v , the function
√
vixi(vi,v−i) is non-decreasing and concave. Consequently, we can
find an ex-post feasible allocation that maximizes
∑n
i=1
√
vixi(vi,v−i) by invoking the equi-
marginal principle [5], which states that it is optimal (up to discretization error) to allocate
greedily until supply is exhausted. That is, assuming vi ≥ 0, we calculate
δi(vi,v−i) =
√
vi
(√
xi(vi,v−i) + −
√
xi(vi,v−i)
)
,
and then allocate to i∗ ∈ arg maxi{δi(vi,v−i)}, breaking ties randomly. Since the resulting
allocation rule is monotone—higher values are more likely to be allocated—it can be plugged
into Myerson’s payment rule (as we have extended it to the convex perceived payment
setting) to obtain an optimal IC, IR, and ex-post feasible pseudo-surplus-maximizing auction.
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This heuristic procedure—1. greedily solve for an allocation rule that optimizes pseudo-
surplus (an upper bound), and 2. support that allocation rule with Myerson’s payment
rule—approximates RRM from above.
Generalizing slightly, Algorithm 3 solves (up to some set discretization factor , and for
α = 1/2) the following mathematical program, which we call Program C, for “concave”:
given a vector of constants c ∈ Rn and α ∈ (0, 1),
max
x (c )
n∑
i=1
cαi (xi(ci, c−i))
α (17)
subject to
n∑
i=1
xi(ci, c−i) ≤ 1 (18)
0 ≤ xi(ci, c−i) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N. (19)
Using Algorithm 3, Algorithm 4 produces a pseudo-surplus maximizing IC, IR, XP auction.
Algorithm 3 Equi-marginal Principle Solver
1: procedure eqp solver(c)
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: xi(c)← 0
4: end for
5: for i = 1 to n do
6: c+i ← max{ci, 0}
7: end for
8: if any of the ci’s are positive then
9: while
∑n
i=1 xi(c) < 1 do
10: M ← arg maxi
{√
c+i
(√
xi(ci, c−i) + −
√
xi(ci, c−i)
)}
11: for all i∗ ∈M do
12: xi∗(ci∗ , c−i∗)← xi∗(ci∗ , c−i∗) + /|M |
13: end for
14: end while
15: end if
16: return x(c)
17: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Pseudo-Surplus Maximizer
1: for all v ∈ T do
2: x(v)← eqp solver(v)
3: end for
4: W ← Ev
[∑n
i=1
√
vixi(vi,v−i)
]
. Total expected pseudo-surplus
5: Calculate the payment rule p using Equation (10)
6: return W , x , p
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Example 5.1. Suppose there are n bidders, with Ti = {1}, for all bidders i ∈ N =
{1, . . . , n}. When bidder utilities are quasi-linear, surplus maximization prescribes that
we assign xi(v) = 1 to a bidder i whose type is maximal, and xj(v) = 0 to all other bidders
j ∈ N \ i. By Myerson’s payment rule (Equation (8) with qi = pi), this allocation rule yields
payments pi(vi,v−i) = 1 and pj(vj,v−j) = 0 for j ∈ N \ i. Therefore, surplus and revenue
are both 1, making surplus a tight upper bound on revenue.
When perceived payments are convex with qi = p
2
i , an integral allocation may not be
optimal. Pseudo-surplus and revenue are both maximized when xi(vi,v−i) = 1/n for all
bidders i ∈ N , and by Myerson’s payment rule (Equation (10)), all bidders pay pi(vi,v−i) =√
1/n. Pseudo-surplus and revenue are both
√
n, so analogous to the quasi-linear case,
pseudo-surplus is a tight upper bound on revenue in our convex perceived payment setting.
Interestingly, in this example, bidder surplus, is not an upper bound on revenue, because∑n
i=1 vixi(vi,v−i) = 1 ≤
√
n =
∑n
i=1 pi(vi,v−i). Thus, unlike in the usual setting with linear
perceived payments, where bidder surplus upper bounds revenue, revenue in the convex
perceived payment setting can actually exceed bidder surplus.
Algorithm 3 applies the equi-marginal principle specifically to the sum of square root
functions, subject to ex-post feasibility. But this algorithm works equally well when applied
to the sum of any concave functions. In fact, when the concave functions are differentiable, as
in Equations (17), (18), and (19), this program can be solved in closed form (see Section 7.2).
But Algorithm 3 remains applicable and Algorithm 4 finds a pseudo-surplus maximizing IC,
IR, XP auction, even in cases where the concave functions are not differentiable.
The two subroutines presented above—pointwise maximization and the equi-marginal
principle—are both used in the next section when we revisit Myerson’s virtual values.
5.2 Myerson’s Virtual Values
In his seminal work on optimal auction design, Myerson proved that expected revenue can
be expressed as something he called expected virtual surplus, which he defined in terms
of virtual values. Myerson used this theorem to reduce the problem of finding an optimal
robust auction to pointwise optimization in virtual value space. In this section, we restate
Myerson’s theorem and algorithm for discrete, rather than continuous, types. In the next
section, we go on to use virtual values to heuristically lower bound revenue when perceived
payments are convex, and utilities hence concave.
Following Section 3, we assume bidder i’s type space is Ti = {zi,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ Mi}, of
cardinality Mi, where zi,j < zi,k for j < k, and we let zi,Mi+1 = zi,Mi . We also assume the
probability of type zi,k ∈ Ti is given by cumulative distribution function Fi,k ≡ Fi(zi,k) and
corresponding probability mass function fi,k ≡ fi(zi,k).
Using this notation, here is the definition of virtual values for discrete distributions:
ψi(zi,k, zi,k+1) = zi,k − (zi,k+1 − zi,k)
(
1− Fi,k
fi,k
)
. (20)
We abbreviate the virtual value ψi(zi,k, zi,k+1) by ψi,k. We also use the shorthand ψi(vi) ≡
ψi(zi,k, zi,k+1), when vi = zi,k for some 1 ≤ k ≤Mi.
Using the discrete version of Myerson’s payment formula (Theorem 3.1), and following a
similar analysis to that of Myerson [8], we arrive at the following theorem.
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Theorem 5.2. Assume bidders’ utilities take the form of Equation (1). If a mechanism is
IC and IR, then for all bidders i,
E
zi,k∼Fi
[qi(zi,k,v−i)] = E
zi,k∼Fi
[ψi,k xi(zi,k,v−i)] . (21)
(The right-hand side of Equation (22) is called bidder i’s expected virtual surplus, because
it is surplus in virtual value space.)
By Theorem 5.2, when perceived payments are linear (i.e., qi = pi), each bidder’s expected
(actual) payment is equal to his expected virtual surplus. Furthermore, total expected
revenue is equal to total expected virtual surplus:
E
v
[
n∑
i=1
pi(vi,v−i)
]
= E
v
[
n∑
i=1
ψi(vi)xi(vi,v−i)
]
. (22)
Mimicking Equations (15) and (16), virtual surplus (the right-hand side of Equation (22))
can be maximized in the same pointwise fashion as surplus and pseudo-surplus:
max
x
E
v
[
n∑
i=1
ψi(vi)xi(vi,v−i)
]
= E
v
[
max
x (v )
n∑
i=1
ψi(vi)xi(vi,v−i)
]
. (23)
Furthermore, by Equation (22), maximizing virtual surplus also maximizes revenue. So,
in fact, Myerson’s virtual value theorem (Theorem 5.2) gives rise to a pointwise method
(Algorithm 5) for finding a revenue-maximizing ex-post feasible allocation rule: for each v ,
simply allocate to one of the bidders with the highest virtual value.
The next question, then, is: is this allocation rule monotone? If so, we can apply Myer-
son’s payment formula to arrive at a mechanism that is also IC and IR. But there is nothing
that guarantees that the resulting allocation rule is monotone; the rule depends on virtual
values, while monotonicity is a constraint on values. So, we need one further assumption on
the bidders’ type distributions to ensure monotonicity of virtual values in values: i.e., for all
bidders i ∈ N , ψi,k+1 ≥ ψi,k whenever zi,k+1 ≥ zi,k. This assumption is called regularity.
Assuming regularity, pointwise optimization of virtual surplus yields a monotonic allocation
rule, and Algorithm 5 yields a solution to RRM in the linear perceived payment case.
Algorithm 5 Virtual Surplus Maximizer
1: for all v ∈ T do
2: for all i ∈ N do
3: ψi ← ψi(vi) . Calculate virtual values using Equation (20).
4: end for
5: x(v)← Pointwise Maximization(ψ)
6: end for
7: Calculate the payment rule p using Equation (8) with q = p
8: R← Ev [
∑n
i=1 pi(vi,v−i)] . Total expected revenue/virtual surplus
9: return R, x , p
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Remark 5.3. The auction that falls out of Algorithm 5 can be interpreted as one with per-
bidder reserve prices. Restricting the search to positive virtual values (Algorithm 1, Line 5)
ensures that the winning bidder’s bid exceeds not only the second-highest bid, but in addition
the smallest value for which his inverse virtual value function is zero. Plugging the resulting
allocation into Myerson’s payment formula then dictates that the winning bidder pay the
maximum of the second-highest bid and the inverse of his virtual value function at zero,5
the latter of which functions as his reserve price.
5.3 Heuristic Lower Bound
In the more general case of convex perceived payments, expected revenue does not equal
expected virtual surplus. Nonetheless, for qi = p
2
i , we can derive bounds on expected revenue
in terms of expected virtual surplus. One operational upper bound is pseudo-surplus; we
present a second, non-operational upper bound expressed in terms of virtual surplus in
Appendix B. Here, we present a heuristic lower bound, also in terms of virtual surplus,
which lends itself to a heuristic procedure that approximates RRM.
Theorem 5.4. If bidders’ utilities take the form of Equation (1) and qi(pi) is quadratic (i.e.,
qi(pi(zi,k,v−i)) = (pi(zi,k,v−i))
2), then expected payments can be lower-bounded as follows:
E
zi,k∼Fi
[pi(zi,k,v−i)] ≥ E
zi,k∼Fi
[
ψi,k xi(zi,k,v−i)
pi(zi,k,v−i)
]
. (24)
Proof. First, observe the following:
E
zi,k∼Fi
[pi(zi,k,v−i)] = E
zi,k∼Fi
[
pi(zi,k,v−i)2
pi(zi,k,v−i)
]
(25)
=
Mi∑
k=1
fi,k
[
zi,k xi(zi,k,v−i)−
∑k−1
j=1(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xi(zi,j,v−i)
pi(zi,k,v−i)
]
(26)
=
Mi∑
k=1
fi,k zi,k xi(zi,k,v−i)
pi(zi,k,v−i)
−
Mi∑
k=1
k−1∑
j=1
fi,k (zi,j+1 − zi,j)xi(zi,j,v−i)
pi(zi,k,v−i)
. (27)
We now work only with the negative part of Equation (27). By summation by parts, this
expression equals:
Mi∑
j=1
Mi∑
k=j+1
fi,k (zi,j+1 − zi,j)xi(zi,j,v−i)
pi(zi,k,v−i)
(28)
≤
Mi∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xi(zi,j,v−i)
(
Mi∑
k=j+1
fi,k
pi(zi,j,v−i)
)
(29)
=
Mi∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xi(zi,j,v−i)
(
1− Fi,j
pi(zi,j,v−i)
)
. (30)
5When the inverse is not a singleton, he pays the minimum value in this set.
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Equation (29) follows from the fact that pi(zi,j+1,v−i) ≥ pi(zi,j,v−i), which follows in turn
from the fact that qi(zi,j+1,v−i) ≥ qi(zi,j,v−i). Equation (30) is the result of substituting∑Mi
k=j+1 fi,k = 1− Fi,j.
Merging back in the positive part of Equation (27) and re-arranging yields:
E
zi,k∼Fi
[pi(zi,k,v−i)] ≥
Mi∑
k=1
fi,k zi,k xi(zi,k,v−i)
pi(zi,k,v−i)
−
Mi∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xi(zi,j,v−i)
(
1− Fi,j
pi(zi,j,v−i)
)
(31)
=
Mi∑
k=1
fi,k xi(zi,k,v−i)
pi(zi,k,v−i)
(
zi,k − (zk+1 − zi,k)
(
1− Fi,k
fi,k
))
(32)
=
Mi∑
k=1
fi,k
(
ψi,k xi(zi,k,v−i)
pi(zi,k,v−i)
)
(33)
= E
zi,k∼Fi
[
ψi,k xi(zi,k,v−i)
pi(zi,k,v−i)
]
. (34)
Example 5.5. Following up on Example 5.1, in which Ti = {1}, we find that ψi,1 = 1, for
all bidders i ∈ N . In this case, the lower bound (Equation (24)) is tight:
ψi,1 xi(vi,v−i)
pi(zi,v−i)
=
(1)
(
1
n
)√
1
n
=
√
n
n
=
√
1
n
= pi(vi,v−i).
Although Theorem 5.4 is actually a claim about expectations, let us make the stronger
assumption that for all vi ∈ Ti and v−i ∈ T−i,
pi(vi,v−i) ≥
ψi(vi)xi(vi,v−i)
pi(vi,v−i)
; (35)
equivalently, (pi(vi,v−i))
2 ≥ ψi(vi)xi(vi,v−i). Now, letting ψ+i (vi) = max{ψi(vi), 0}, it also
holds that (pi(vi,v−i))
2 ≥ ψ+i (vi)xi(vi,v−i); equivalently, pi(vi,v−i) ≥
√
ψ+i (vi)xi(vi,v−i).
Summing over all bidders and then taking expectations yields:
E
v
[
n∑
i=1
pi(vi,v−i)
]
≥ E
v
[
n∑
i=1
√
ψ+i (vi)xi(vi,v−i)
]
, (36)
which gives us a new heuristic objective of maximizing the right-hand side of Equation (36).
As usual, we optimize this expression in a pointwise fashion subject to ex-post feasibility.
Given v , the function
√
ψ+i (vi)xi(vi,v−i) is non-decreasing and concave. Consequently,
we can find an ex-post feasible allocation that maximizes
∑n
i=1
√
ψ+i (vi)xi(vi,v−i) by invok-
ing the equi-marginal principle [5]. That is, we calculate
δi(vi,v−i) =
√
ψ+i,k
(√
xi(vi,v−i) + −
√
xi(vi,v−i)
)
,
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and then allocate  to arg maxi{δi(vi,v−i)}. Assuming regularity, the resulting allocation
rule is monotone (higher values are allocated more), so it can be plugged into Myerson’s
payment rule (as we have extended it to the convex perceived payment setting) to obtain an
optimal IC, IR, and ex-post feasible revenue-maximizing auction. This heuristic procedure—
1. greedily solve for an allocation rule that optimizes the heuristic lower bound, and 2. support
that allocation rule with Myerson’s payment rule—approximates RRM from below. (See
Algorithm 6.)
Algorithm 6 Heuristic Lower Bound Maximizer
1: for all v ∈ T do
2: for all i ∈ N do
3: ψi ← ψi(vi) . Calculate virtual values using Equation (20)
4: end for
5: x(v)← eqp solver(ψ)
6: end for
7: Calculate the payment rule p using Equation (10)
8: R← Ev [
∑n
i=1 pi(vi,v−i)] . Total expected revenue
9: return R, x , p
Example 5.6 (Reserve bids). Suppose the bidders have values drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution, where zi,k ∈ Ti = {j/Mi : j ∈ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ Mi}, fi,k = 1/Mi and Fi,k = k/Mi,
for each bidder i ∈ N and 1 ≤ j ≤ Mi. In an optimal auction, values that have negative
corresponding virtual values are rejected. Since ψi(zi,k) = 2k/Mi − 1, the minimum k for
which ψi(zi,k) ≥ 0 is k∗ = dMi/2e. So, given v−i, the allocation variable xi(vi,v−i) can only
be positive if vi ≥ zi,k∗ = k∗/Mi = dMi/2e/Mi.
If we insist upon an integral allocation rule (as in the case of an indivisible good, for
example), so that exactly one bidder i is allocated with xi(vi,v−i) = 1, i must bid at
least zi,k∗ , in which case i pays qi(zi,k∗ ,v−i) = zi,k∗ . When Mi is even, zi,k∗ = 1/2, so
qi(zi,k∗ ,v−i) = 1/2. Assuming linear perceived payments, so that qi = pi, it follows that
pi(zi,k∗ ,v−i) = 1/2; assuming convex perceived payments, so that qi = p2i , it follows that
pi(zi,k∗ ,v−i) =
√
1/2 =
√
2/2.
When we allow for a fractional allocation rule, i must again bid at least zi,k∗ to be
allocated. If, for example, xi(zi,k∗ ,v−i) = 1/2, then qi(zi,k∗ ,v−i) = zi,k∗/2. When Mi is even,
zi,k∗ = 1/2, so qi(zi,k∗ ,v−i) = 1/4. Assuming linear perceived payments, so that qi = pi, it
follows that pi(zi,k∗ ,v−i) = 1/4; assuming convex perceived payments, so that qi = p2i , it
follows that pi(zi,k∗ ,v−i) =
√
1/4 = 1/2.
N.B. In this example, if, when allowing for a fractional (or randomized) allocation rule,
two bidders are both allocated 1/2, they both pay 1/2, and total revenue (1) exceeds total
revenue in the case of an integral allocation rule only (
√
2/2).
6 Bayesian Revenue Maximization
We now turn our attention to the problem of Bayesian revenue maximization in our convex
perceived payment setting. With a bit more effort, we are again able to apply Myerson’s pay-
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ment rule, but unlike in the robust case, the logic employed here is not merely a straightfor-
ward generalization or application of Myerson’s original reasoning. Specifically, we produce
a smaller mathematical program than the default revenue-maximizing one: whereas the de-
fault program has exponentially-many payment variables, ours has only polynomially-many;
but it still has exponentially-many allocation variables and ex-post feasibility constraints.
Our strategy is as follows: First we show that in our search for an optimal Bayesian
auction, it suffices to restrict our attention to auctions in which each bidder’s payment is a
(deterministic) function hi : Ti → R of his type alone, irrespective of other bidders’ types.
Second, since by design this interim payment function hi is such that qˆi(vi) = (hi(vi))
2, by
Corollary 3.3, hi is given by Equation (11).
Consider a (possibly randomized) auction, Auction A, where pAi (vi,v−i, r) denotes bidder
i’s payment in auction A. (Here, r is the outcome of some randomization device.) We define
another (deterministic) auction, Auction B, with payment rule pBi (vi,v−i) = hi(vi) for some
function hi(vi) that depends only on vi. More specifically,
hi(vi) =
√
E
v−i,r
[
(pAi (vi,v−i, r))
2
]
. (37)
Lemma 6.1. An arbitrary allocation x ∈ [0, 1]n, together with the corresponding payment
rule pˆA or pˆB, satisfies BIC, BIR, and ex-post feasibility for Auction A if and only if it
satisfies BIC, BIR, and ex-post feasibility for Auction B.
Proof. An arbitrary allocation x ∈ [0, 1]n satisfies ex-post feasibility for Auction A if and
only if satisfies ex-post feasibility for B, as these set of constraints are identical in both
auctions. The BIC and BIR constraints, however, can differ across the two auctions because
payments can differ. Nonetheless, we now proceed to show that an arbitrary allocation x
satisfies BIC and BIR for Auction A if and only if it satisfies these properties for Auction B.
Since
E
v−i
[(
pBi (vi,v−i)
)2]
= E
v−i
[
(hi(vi))
2
]
(38)
= (hi(vi))
2 (39)
=
(√
E
v−i,r
[
(pAi (vi,v−i, r))
2
])2
(40)
= E
v−i,r
[(
pAi (vi,v−i, r)
)2]
, (41)
it follows that
qˆBi (vi) = E
v−i
[
qi(p
B
i (vi,v−i))
]
(42)
= E
v−i
[(
pBi (vi,v−i)
)2]
(43)
= E
v−i,r
[(
pAi (vi,v−i, r)
)2]
(44)
= E
v−i,r
[
qi(p
A
i (vi,v−i, r))
]
(45)
= qˆAi (vi). (46)
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Therefore, for all bidders i ∈ N and values vi, wi ∈ Ti,
vixˆi(vi)− qˆBi (vi) ≥ vixˆi(wi)− qˆBi (wi) if and only if vixˆi(vi)− qˆAi (vi) ≥ vixˆi(wi)− qˆAi (wi) (47)
and
vixˆi(vi)− qˆBi (vi) ≥ 0 if and only if vixˆi(vi)− qˆAi (vi) ≥ 0. (48)
In other words, x (and the corresponding payment rule pˆ) is BIC and BIR for Auction A if
and only if it is BIC and BIR for Auction B.
Lemma 6.2. The total expected revenue of Auction B is at least that of Auction A.
Proof. Let RB =
∑n
i=1 Ev
[
pBi (vi,v−i)
]
denote the expected revenue of Auction B, and
let RA =
∑n
i=1 Ev
[
pAi (vi,v−i)
]
denote the expected revenue of Auction A. By Jensen’s
inequality, since the square root is a concave function,
hi(vi) =
√
E
v−i,r
[
(pAi (vi,v−i, r))
2
]
(49)
≥ E
v−i,r
[√
(pAi (vi,v−i, r))
2
]
(50)
= E
v−i,r
[
pAi (vi,v−i, r)
]
, (51)
it follows that
RB =
n∑
i=1
E
v
[
pBi (vi,v−i)
]
(52)
=
n∑
i=1
E
vi
[hi(vi)] (53)
≥
n∑
i=1
E
vi
[
E
v−i,r
[
pAi (vi,v−i, r)
]]
(54)
=
n∑
i=1
E
v ,r
[
pAi (vi,v−i, r)
]
(55)
= RA. (56)
In other words, the expected revenue of Auction B is at least that of Auction A.
These two lemmas establish that in our search for an optimal auction, it suffices to
restrict our attention to auctions like Auction B in which each bidder’s payment is a (deter-
ministic) function hi of his type alone. Furthermore, since qˆ
B
i (vi) = Ev−i
[
qi(p
B
i (vi,v−i))
]
=
Ev−i
[(
pBi (vi,v−i)
)2]
= Ev−i [(hi(vi))2] = (hi(vi))
2, it follows by Corollary 3.3 that hi is given
by Equation (11): i.e.,
hi(zi,`) =
√√√√zi,`xˆi(zi,`)− `−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xˆi(zi,j). (57)
These two lemmas together with this final observation establish the follow theorem:
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Theorem 6.3. The mathematical program given in Section C.2.2, with only polynomially-
many payment variables, gives a solution to the BRM problem, which when stated naively
involves exponentially-many such variables (Section C.2.1).
Remark 6.4. Theorem 6.3 holds not only for qi = p
2
i , but for any qi = Ci(pi), where Ci(·) is
an invertible convex function. The only necessary modification in the proof of Theorem 6.3
is that we now consider deterministic payments of the form
hi(vi) = C
−1
i
(
E
v−i
[
Ci
(
pAi (vi,v−i)
)])
. (58)
The theorem then follows by the concavity of C−1i (·).
We close this section with a heuristic for approximating BRM. Analogous to Algorithm 6,
which describes a method to approximate RRM from below, Algorithm 7 approximates BRM
from below. The only difference between these two algorithms is that Algorithm 6 uses
Equation (10) to determine payments, whereas this new heuristic uses Equation (11).
Algorithm 7 Bayesian Heuristic Lower Bound Maximizer
1: for all v ∈ T do
2: for all i ∈ N do
3: ψi ← ψi(vi) . Calculate virtual values using Equation (20)
4: end for
5: x(v)← eqp solver(ψ)
6: end for
7: Calculate the interim allocation rule xˆ
8: Calculate the payment rule h using Equation (11).
9: R← Ev [
∑n
i=1 hi(vi)] . Total expected revenue
10: return R, x , h
7 Closed-Form Solutions
Next we present closed-form solutions to three mathematical programs of interest. The first
problem we study is the ex-ante relaxation of BRM, which requires only polynomially-many
constraints. We present an intuitive, closed-form solution to a relaxation of this relaxation,
which yields a closed-form upper bound on the ex-ante Bayesian problem.
This solution also upper bounds RRM. Nonetheless, we derive a tighter upper bound in
closed form. Specifically, the second two programs we discuss in this section optimize the
upper and heuristic lower bounds we derived for RRM, subject to the usual ex-post feasibility
constraints. While both these programs can both be solved greedily (Algorithm 3), we derive
closed-form solutions, assuming the payment function is differentiable.
In searching for a near-optimal auction, all three of these problems optimize allocation
variables. Interestingly and intuitively, all our closed-form solutions allocate in proportion to
value (or virtual value). Consequently, the resulting allocation rules are all monotone,6 which
means that they support Myerson payments, and yield approximately-optimal auctions.
6assuming regularity
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7.1 A Relaxation of the Ex-Ante Relaxation of BRM
Recall Theorem 5.4: Expected payments, when bidders have quasi-linear utility functions
as described by Equation (1) and qi(pi(vi,v−i)) = (pi(vi,v−i))2, can be lower-bounded as
follows:
E
vi∼Fi
[pi(vi,v−i)] ≥ E
vi∼Fi
[
ψi(vi)xi(vi,v−i)
pi(vi,v−i)
]
. (59)
Following similar logic, and taking expectations throughout, yields a similar lower bound:
E
vi∼Fi
[pˆi(vi)] ≥ E
vi∼Fi
[
ψi(vi) xˆi(vi)
pˆi(vi)
]
. (60)
Like Equation (59), Equation (60) is a claim about expectations. Still, let us make the
stronger assumption that for all vi ∈ Ti,
pˆi(vi) ≥ ψi(vi) xˆi(vi)
pˆi(vi)
; (61)
equivalently, (pˆi(vi))
2 ≥ ψi(vi) xˆi(vi). Now, letting ψ+i (vi) = max{ψi(vi), 0}, it also holds
that (pˆi(vi))
2 ≥ ψ+i (vi) xˆi(vi); equivalently, pˆi(vi) ≥
√
ψ+i (vi) xˆi(vi). Taking expectations
and then summing over all bidders yields:
n∑
i=1
E
vi
[pˆi(vi)] ≥
n∑
i=1
E
vi
[√
ψ+i (vi) xˆi(vi)
]
, (62)
which gives us a new heuristic objective of maximizing the right-hand side of Equation (62).
Note that this new objective cannot be maximized in a pointwise fashion, because the various
value vectors v cannot be treated independently in an ex-ante problem. On the contrary,
all the various allocations xi(vi,v−i) interact through the one ex-ante feasibility constraint.
Although we cannot maximize pointwise, we can still approximate a solution to the ex-
ante relaxation by solving a mathematical program with this heuristic objective function
and the relevant feasibility constraints. We go one step further and propose the following
heuristic program as a means of approximating an optimal allocation:
max
xˆ≥0
n∑
i=1
Mi∑
k=1
fi,k
√
ψ+i,k xˆi(zi,k) (63)
subject to
n∑
i=1
Mi∑
k=1
fi,k xˆi(zi,k) ≤ 1. (64)
This heuristic program ensures only ex-ante feasibility, but drops the constraints that the
interim allocation variables lie in the range [0, 1] (and indeed, they need not in the ensuing
solution). Interestingly, we can solve this program in closed form.
Theorem 7.1. The optimal solution to this heuristic program (call it Program A) is to
allocate in proportion to virtual values:
xˆi(zi,k) =
ψ+i,k∑n
i=1 Ezi,j∼Fi
[
ψ+i,j
] . (65)
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Under the regularity assumption, this proportional allocation is monotone, so can be sup-
ported by Bayesian (i.e., BIC and BIR) payments.
Proof. Let yi,k =
√
xˆi(zi,k), and rewrite Program A as follows:
max
y
n∑
i=1
Mi∑
k=1
fi,k
√
ψ+i,k yi,k (66)
subject to
n∑
i
Mi∑
k=1
fi,k y
2
i,k ≤ 1 (67)
yi,k ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ {1, . . . ,Mi}. (68)
Call this new program Program B.
Now consider the Lagrangian of Program B, dropping the positivity constraints as they
are redundant:
L(xˆ, µ) =
n∑
i=1
Mi∑
k=1
fi,k
√
ψ+i,k yi,k + µ
(
1−
n∑
i=1
Mi∑
k=1
fi,k y
2
i,k
)
. (69)
By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect
to each yi,k must equal 0:
fi,k
√
ψ+i,k − µ (2 fi,k yi,k) = 0. (70)
In other words, yi,k =
√
ψi,k/2µ.
At any optimal solution, Constraint (67) will be tight, since otherwise we could increase
the objective value by increasing some yi,j for which fi,j
√
ψi,j > 0 by an infinitesimal amount.
So:
n∑
i=1
Mi∑
j=1
fi,j y
2
i,j = 1. (71)
Replacing yi,j with
√
ψ+i,j/2µ in Equation (71) yields:
n∑
i=1
Mi∑
j=1
fi,j
(
ψ+i,j
(2µ)2
)
= 1 (72)
so that
2µ =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
Mi∑
j=1
fi,j ψ
+
i,j. (73)
Now substituting µ into Equation (70), we arrive at a closed-form solution to Program B:
yi,k =
√√√√ ψ+i,k∑n
i=1
∑Mi
j=1 fi,j ψ
+
i,j
. (74)
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Equivalently, the optimal solution to Program A takes the form:
xˆi(zi,k) = y
2
i,k =
ψ+i,k∑n
i=1
∑Mi
j=1 fi,j ψ
+
i,j
. (75)
Finally, observe that for all bidders i,
Mi∑
j=1
fi,j ψ
+
i,j = E
zi,j∼Fj
[
ψ+i,j
]
. (76)
Therefore, the closed-form solution to Program A takes the intuitive form:
xˆi(zi,k) =
ψ+i,k∑n
i=1 Ezi,j∼Fi
[
ψ+i,j
] . (77)
7.2 A Closed-form Upper and Heuristic Lower Bound on RRM
In this section, we present closed-form solutions to two mathematical programs that upper
and (heuristically) lower bound RRM. In the first, the objective function is pseudo-surplus,
an upper bound on revenue. The second uses as an objective function the heuristic lower
bound we derived for RRM based on virtual values (Equation (36)). Solving these programs
in closed form yields solutions that allocate in proportion to value. Such monotonic allocation
rules can be supported via Myerson’s payment rule.
Theorem 7.2. The optimal solution to Program C is
xj(cj, c−j) =
(
c+j
)α/(1−α)∑n
i=1
(
c+i
)α/(1−α) , ∀j ∈ N, ∀c ∈ Rn, (78)
where c+i = max{0, ci}, whenever there exists at least one positive entry in c.
Proof. Bidders whose constants ci are negative are not allocated, and bidders whose con-
stants ci are zero have no impact, so we restrict our attention to bidders with positive
constants. That is, it suffices to allocate assuming we are given c+ instead of c .
The derivative of the contribution of bidder i is
∂
(
c+i
)α
(xi(ci, c−i))
α
∂xi(ci, c−i)
=
1
α
(
c+i
)α
(xi(ci, c−i))
α−1 . (79)
Equating derivatives for bidders i and j (as per the equi-marginal principle), we get
1
α
(
c+i
)α
(xi(ci, c−i))
α−1 =
1
α
(
c+j
)α (
xj(cj, c−j)
)α−1
. (80)
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The common terms can be removed, and after raising the expressions to the 1/(1−α) power,
we can simplify to (
c+i
)α/(1−α)
xi(ci, c−i)
=
(
c+i
)α/(1−α)
xj(cj, c−j)
. (81)
Therefore, bidder i’s allocation in terms of bidder j is
xi(ci, c−i) =
(
c+i
c+j
)α/(1−α)
xj(cj, c−j). (82)
Plugging this expression into the ex-post feasibility condition yields:
n∑
i=1
xi(ci, c−i) =
n∑
i=1
(
c+i
c+j
)α/(1−α)
xj(cj, c−j). (83)
It is always optimal to allocate until
∑n
i=1 xi(ci, c−i) = 1 when there is at least one bidder
with a positive constant, so the ex-post feasibility constraint can be written as
n∑
i=1
(
c+i
c+j
)α/(1−α)
xj(cj, c−j) = 1. (84)
Therefore, bidder j is allocated as follows:
xj(cj, c−j) =
(
c+j
)α/(1−α)∑n
i=1
(
c+i
)α/(1−α) . (85)
The following corollary is immediate:
Corollary 7.3. The optimal solution to Program C when α = 1/2 is
xj(cj, c−j) =
c+j∑n
i=1 c
+
i
, ∀j ∈ N,∀c ∈ T, (86)
where c+i = max{0, ci}, whenever there exists at least one positive entry in c.
When the constants c are values, the objective function in program C is pseudo-surplus.
When the constants c are virtual values, the objective function in program C is our heuristic
lower bound. Consequently, Theorem 7.2 immediately gives rise to closed-form solutions to
these two mathematical programs of interest.
Corollary 7.4. The following allocation is optimal when α = 1/2 and c = v (i.e., when the
objective function is pseudo-surplus):
xj(vj,v−j) =
v+j∑n
i=1 v
+
i
, ∀j ∈ N, ∀v ∈ T, (87)
where v+i = max{0, vi}, when there exists at least one positive entry in v.
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Corollary 7.5. The following allocation is optimal when α = 1/2 and c = ψ (i.e., when
the objective function is our heuristic lower bound):
xj(vj,v−j) =
ψ+j (vj)∑n
i=1 ψ
+
i (vi)
, ∀j ∈ N, ∀v ∈ T, (88)
where ψ+i (vi) = max{0, ψi(vi)}, when there exists at least one positive entry in ψ.
Corollaries 7.4 and 7.5 gives rise to respective variants of Algorithm 4, Algorithm 6, and
Algorithm 7: in each algorithm, simply replace the call to the equi-marginal principle solver
with the corresponding closed form. Like their counterparts, these heuristics, which employ
closed-form solutions instead of greedy ones, and then plug the resulting allocation rules into
Myerson’s payment formula, approximate optimal auctions.
Algorithm 8 Pseudo-Surplus Maximizer (Closed-form)
1: for all v ∈ T do
2: Calculate the allocation rule x(v) using Corollary 7.4
3: end for
4: W ← Ev
[∑n
i=1
√
vixi(vi,v−i)
]
. Total expected pseudo-surplus
5: Calculate the payment rule p using Equation (10).
6: return W , x , p
Algorithm 9 Heuristic Lower Bound Maximizer (Closed-form)
1: for all v ∈ T do
2: for all i ∈ N do
3: ψi ← ψi(vi) . Calculate virtual values using Equation (20)
4: end for
5: Calculate the allocation rule x(v) using Corollary 7.5
6: end for
7: Calculate the payment rule p using Equation (10).
8: R← Ev [
∑n
i=1 pi(vi,v−i)] . Total expected revenue
9: return R, x , p
Remark 7.6. If values are continuous as in Myerson’s original paper, then Equation (8) is
qi(vi,v−i) = vixi(vi,v−i)−
∫ vi
0
xi(z,v−i) dz, (89)
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Algorithm 10 Bayesian Heuristic Lower Bound Maximizer (Closed-form)
1: for all v ∈ T do
2: for all i ∈ N do
3: ψi ← ψi(vi) . Calculate virtual values using Equation (20)
4: end for
5: Calculate the allocation rule x(v) using Corollary 7.5
6: end for
7: Calculate the interim allocation rule xˆ
8: Calculate the payment rule h using Equation (11).
9: R← Ev [
∑n
i=1 hi(vi)] . Total expected revenue
10: return R, x , h
which, letting S =
∑
j 6=i v
+
j , simplifies to
qi(vi,v−i) = vi
(
vi
vi + S
)
−
∫ vi
0
z
z + S
dz (90)
= vi
(
vi
vi + S
)
− [z − S ln (z + S)]vi0 (91)
= vi
(
vi
vi + S
− 1
)
+ S (ln (vi + S)− lnS) (92)
≤ S (ln (vi + S)− lnS) (93)
= S ln
(
vi + S
S
)
. (94)
Since Equation (94) gives an upper bound that is proportional to the marginal gain in log-
surplus, we expect that extracting more revenue from bidder i will become more difficult as
bidder i’s type increases. We see this explicitly when computing derivatives. Specifically,
perceived payment qi(vi,v−i) changes by
dqi(vi,v−i)
dvi
=
viS
(vi + S)
2 ∝
1
vi
, (95)
while actual payment pi(vi,v−i) =
√
qi(vi,v−i) changes by
dpi(vi,v−i)
dvi
=
viS
2 (vi + S)
2 pi(vi,v−i)
∝ 1
vi pi(vi,v−i)
. (96)
8 Experiments
We close this paper with some experimental results implemented in MATLAB demonstrating
the performance of our methods in different settings. As a baseline, we used IBM’s ILOG
CPLEX Optimization Studio to solve RRM and BRM optimally. In comparison, we used
our heuristic procedures to generate heuristic lower bounds on total expected revenue, for
33
8.1 Pseudo-surplus in the Robust Problem 8 EXPERIMENTS
auctions that satisfy all the relevant constraints. We also computed pseudo-surplus (ensuring
ex-post feasibility only) to give upper bounds on total expected revenue; but we did not
compute accompanying payments, so we did not ensure IC and IR or BIC and BIR. Finally,
we also solved the ex-ante relaxation of BRM to obtain a nearly instantaneous upper bound
on solutions to all our problems.
All programs were run on a system with an Intel Core i5 3.5 GHz processor and 8 GB of
RAM. We compared total expected revenue and run time for different numbers of bidders.
The number of bidders we used was limited by processing time and memory constraints.
In all simulations, bidders were symmetric, meaning Fi = Fj for all bidders i and j. We
studied three different bidder distributions: categorical, uniform, and binomial.
While most of our heuristics are powerful enough to apply to any convex function (not
only qi = p
2
i ), our experiments are restricted to this case because, to our knowledge, CPLEX
(for MATLAB) can only handle objective functions and constraints that are linear, quadratic,
or integer.
Categorical Distribution Each bidder i has type vi ∈ Ti = {L,H}, where L = 3 and H = 10.
The probability mass function values of each type are fi(L) = 0.8 and fi(H) = 0.2. Total
expected revenue and run times for this distribution are shown in Figures 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a,
8a, 9a, 10a, and 11a.
Uniform Distribution Each bidder i has type vi ∈ Ti = {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, where fi(vi) =
0.2 for all vi ∈ Ti. Total expected revenue and run times for this distribution are shown in
Figures 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, 7b, 8b, 9b, 10b, and 11b.
Binomial Distribution Each bidder i has type vi ∈ Ti = {k : 0 ≤ k ≤ 4, k ∈ N}, where fi(k) =(
4
k
)
pk(1− p)4−k and p = 0.5. Total expected revenue and run times for this distribution are
shown in Figures 3c, 4c, 5c, 6c, 7c, 8c, 9c, 10c, and 11c.
8.1 Pseudo-surplus in the Robust Problem
We optimize pseudo-surplus in the robust problem (see Section C.1.2). We report the results
of the following two methods:
• (MATLAB) Total expected pseudo-surplus using Algorithm 4 (the greedy method),
but without calculating payments.
• (MATLAB) Total expected pseudo-surplus using Algorithm 8 (the closed form), but
without calculating payments.
Both methods achieve the optimal pseudo-surplus, but using Algorithm 8 (the closed
form), we achieve this value more quickly than when using Algorithm 4 (the greedy method).
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Figure 3: Pseudo-surplus in the Robust Problem
8.2 Pseudo-surplus Scaling in the Robust Problem
We optimize pseudo-surplus in the robust problem, ensuring ex-post feasibility (see Sec-
tion C.1.2), to see how it scales with the number of bidders. We report the results of the
following:
• (MATLAB) Total expected pseudo-surplus using Algorithm 8 (the closed form), but
without calculating payments.
While the closed-form method is nearly instantaneous when the number of bidders is
small, it cannot escape the fact that there are exponentially-many allocation variables. (The
behavior of the closed-form solution for the heuristic lower bound—see Section 8.3—is iden-
tical as we scale the number of bidders.)
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Figure 4: Pseudo-surplus Scaling in the Robust Problem
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8.3 Heuristic Lower Bound in the Robust Problem
We optimize the heuristic lower bound ensuring ex-post feasibility (see Section C.1.3). We
report the results of the following two methods:
• (MATLAB) The heuristic lower bound using Algorithm 6 (the greedy method), but
without calculating payments.
• (MATLAB) The heuristic lower bound using Algorithm 9 (the closed form), but with-
out calculating payments.
Both methods achieve the optimal objective value, but using Algorithm 9 (the closed
form), we achieve this value more quickly than when using Algorithm 6 (the greedy method).
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Figure 5: Heuristic Lower Bound in the Robust Problem
8.4 Heuristic Revenue in the Robust Problem
We first optimize our heuristic lower bound in the robust problem (see Section C.1.3). Next,
we plug the resulting allocation rule x into into Myerson’s formula to compute robust pay-
ment rule p (Equation (10)), and then total expected heuristic revenue. Varying the opti-
mization technique, we report the results of the following two methods:
• (MATLAB) Total expected heuristic revenue using Algorithm 6 (the greedy method)
and robust payments (Equation (10)).
• (MATLAB) Total expected heuristic revenue using Algorithm 9 (the closed form) and
robust payments (Equation (10)).
Our choice of discretization factor in our greedy implementation is sufficiently fine that
both methods achieve the same objective value. Moreover, the run times of the two methods
are not noticeably different, because both are dominated by the exponential number of robust
payment calculations. Both these runs are noticeably slower than the pseudo-surplus and
heuristic lower bound runs, which perform no payment calculations at all.
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Figure 6: Heuristic Revenue in the Robust Problem
8.5 Heuristic Revenue in the Bayesian Problem
We first optimize our heuristic lower bound in the robust problem (see Section C.1.3). Next
we collapse the resulting allocation rule x into an interim allocation rule xˆ . Finally, we plug
xˆ into Myerson’s formula to compute Bayesian payment rule h (Equation (11)), and then
total expected heuristic revenue. Varying the optimization technique, we report the results
of the following two methods:
• (MATLAB) Total expected heuristic revenue using Algorithm 7 (the greedy method)
and Bayesian payments (Equation (11)).
• (MATLAB) Total expected heuristic revenue using Algorithm 10 (the closed form) and
Bayesian payments (Equation (11)).
As above, our choice of discretization factor in our greedy implementation is sufficiently
fine that both methods achieve the same objective value. But this time, using Algorithm 10
(the closed form), we achieve this value much more quickly. This is because there are only
polynomially-many payment calculations in the Bayesian problem, so the speed up achieved
by the closed-form method is not eviscerated by expensive payment calculations.
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Figure 7: Heuristic Revenue in the Bayesian Problem
8.6 Heuristic Lower Bound and Heuristic Revenue: Robust vs. Bayesian
We compare the heuristic lower bound in the robust problem; total expected heuristic revenue
in the robust problem; and total expected heuristic revenue in the Bayesian problem. We
report the results of the following three methods:
• (MATLAB) The heuristic lower bound in the robust problem (see Section C.1.3) using
Algorithm 9 (the closed form), but without calculating payments.
• (MATLAB) Total expected heuristic revenue in the robust problem using Algorithm 9
(the closed form and robust payments using Equation (10)).
• (MATLAB) Total expected heuristic revenue in the Bayesian problem using Algo-
rithm 10 (the closed form and Bayesian payments using Equation (11)).
According to the theory developed in this paper, the heuristic lower bound in the robust
problem should not exceed the heuristic revenue in the robust problem, which in turn should
not exceed the heuristic revenue in the Bayesian problem. Our experiments are consistent
with these claims, and further provide examples where the heuristic revenue in the robust
problem strictly exceeds the heuristic lower bound, and where the heuristic revenue in the
Bayesian problem strictly exceeds that of the robust problem.
Moreover, the Bayesian heuristic runs significantly faster than the robust heuristic; this
difference can be attributed to the computation of polynomially- instead of exponentially-
many payments. (The heuristic lower bound computes no payments at all.)
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Figure 8: Robust vs. Bayesian Heuristic Revenue
8.7 Revenue, Pseudo-Surplus, and Heuristic Revenue in the Robust Problem
We report the results of the following:
• (CPLEX) Total expected revenue in the robust problem (see Section C.1.1).
• (MATLAB) Total expected pseudo-surplus in the robust problem (see Section C.1.2)
solved in closed form using Algorithm 8, but without calculating payments.
• (MATLAB) Total expected heuristic revenue in the robust problem (see Section C.1.3)
solved in closed form, and then plugged in to Myerson’s formula for robust payments
(Algorithm 9).
CPLEX solves the robust problem optimally, while the other two programs do not. Fur-
thermore, when there are very few bidders (e.g., 1 or 2), CPLEX solves RRM just as fast as
MATLAB solves for pseudo-surplus or the heuristic revenue. But as the number of bidders
grows, CPLEX does not scale. The heuristic revenue appears to approximate the value of
RRM as determined by CPLEX quite well, and it scales better than CPLEX.
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Figure 9: RRM, Pseudo-Surplus, and Heuristic Revenue
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8.8 Revenue, Pseudo-Surplus, and Heuristic Revenue in the Bayesian problem
We report the results of the following:
• (CPLEX) Total expected revenue in the Bayesian problem using Equation (11) (see
Section C.2.2).
• (CPLEX) Total expected pseudo-surplus in the Bayesian problem (see Section C.2.3).
• (MATLAB) Total expected heuristic revenue in the Bayesian problem (see Section C.2.3,
Remark C.1), solved in closed form, and then plugged in to Myerson’s formula for
Bayesian payments (Algorithm 10).
CPLEX solves the Bayesian problem optimally, while the other two programs do not.
Furthermore, when there are very few bidders (e.g., 1, 2, or 3), CPLEX solves BRM just
as fast as CPLEX solves for pseudo-surplus or MATLAB solves for the heuristic revenue.
But as the number of bidders grows, CPLEX does not scale. The heuristic revenue appears
to approximate the value of BRM as determined by CPLEX quite well, and it scales better
than CPLEX.
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Figure 10: BRM, Pseudo-Surplus, and Heuristic Revenue
8.9 BRM Ex-Ante
We report the results of the following:
• (CPLEX) Total expected revenue of the BRM ex-ante relaxation (see Section C.3.1).
• (MATLAB) Total expected revenue of the BRM ex-ante relaxation (see Section C.3.2)
solved in closed form (see Theorem 7.1) to find an interim allocation rule, and use it
to compute Bayesian payments.
• (MATLAB) Total expected revenue of the BRM, ex-ante relaxation (see Section C.3.2),
solved in closed form (see Theorem 7.1) to find an interim allocation rule, which is then
truncated so that xˆi(vi) ≤ 1 for each i ∈ N and vi ∈ Ti, before using it to compute
Bayesian payments.
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For the BRM ex-ante relaxation, a problem with only polynomially-many variables and
constraints, even CPLEX, which is optimal, appears to scale just fine with the number of
bidders. Indeed, while the approximations are faster than CPLEX on small problems, their
run time eventually grows, while CPLEX does not.
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Figure 11: BRM Ex-Ante Variants
9 Conclusion and Future Work
We analyzed optimal auctions where bidder utilities are quasi-linear, but defined in terms of
convex, instead of the usual linear, payments. We adapted Myerson’s analysis to this setting
when it is required that constraints always hold (i.e., the robust problem) and when it is
required only that they hold in expectation (i.e., the Bayesian problem). We showed that
total expected revenue in the Bayesian problem can exceed the total expected revenue in the
robust problem, and consequently, we analyzed each problem in turn.
In the robust setting, we developed upper and lower bounds on total expected revenue
that can be computed easily using the equi-marginal principle. In the Bayesian setting, we
derived a payment formula that lends itself to a mathematical program that involves fewer
variables than a straightforward implementation of the optimal auction problem. Addition-
ally, we derived closed-form solutions to a relaxation of the Bayesian ex-ante problem, as
well as problems that seek robust upper and lower bounds.
Based on our analysis, we derived heuristics that approximate solutions to both the
robust and Bayesian revenue maximization problems. With three different distributions, we
saw through experiments that our heuristics produce solutions that are close to optimal, and
scale better than the mathematical programming solver we used. However, our experiments
thus far were restricted to quasi-linear utility functions with quadratic perceived payments.
In the future, we hope to run experiments with a wider class of payment functions, beyond
quadratic, and possibly even develop theory that goes beyond convex entirely. Additionally,
we hope to prove guarantees about our heuristics, to further characterize their quality.
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A The Discretization Effect
Let x∗ be an optimal allocation rule in an arbitrary auction design problem, and let x be an
optimal allocation rule in the corresponding discretized problem, with discretization factor
∆ > 0. For all bidders i ∈ N , let 0 ≤ ki ∈ Z be such that
xi(vi,v−i) = ki∆. (97)
The optimal values x∗i (vi,v−i) and our approximation xi(vi,v−i) are related by a residual
vector ρ, each entry of which can be be positive, negative, or zero:
x∗i (vi,v−i) = xi(vi,v−i) + ρi (98)
= ki∆ + ρi, (99)
To determine kis, we use the method of least squares. Specifically, we minimize the
square of the residual L2-norm:
‖ρ‖22 =
n∑
i=1
(x∗i (vi,v−i)− ki∆)2 . (100)
To do so, we take derivatives with respect to ki:
∂
∑n
i=1 (x
∗
i (vi,v−i)− ki∆)2
∂ki
= 2 (x∗i (vi,v−i)− ki∆) (−∆). (101)
Setting the right-hand side of this equation to 0 yields the following intuitive result:
ki =
x∗i (vi,v−i)
∆
. (102)
Enforcing the constraint that ki must be integral leaves two possible candidate kis:
ki =
⌊
x∗i (vi,v−i)
∆
⌋
or ki =
⌈
x∗i (vi,v−i)
∆
⌉
. (103)
In either case,
ρi = x
∗
i (vi,v−i)− xi(vi,v−i) ≤ |x∗i (vi,v−i)− xi(vi,v−i)| ≤ ∆. (104)
Therefore, the residual from bidder i is bounded above by O(∆). Likewise, the total residual
is bounded above by O(n∆).
Having established a method of determining x , we now describe how using x can impact
the total expected perceived payment. Let q∗ and q be the perceived payments resulting
from the allocation rules x∗ and x , respectively. First, we show that the difference in
expected the perceived payment from bidder i when using x instead of x∗ is O(∆). Then,
we conclude that the total expected perceived payment is O(n∆).
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Lemma A.1. The difference in bidder i’s expected perceived payment when using x instead
of x∗ is O(∆): i.e., |Ezi,`∼Fi [q∗i (zi,`,v−i)]− Ezi,`∼Fi [qi(zi,`,v−i)]| ∈ O(∆).
Proof. We can express the difference between Ezi,`∼Fi [q∗i (zi,`,v−i)] and Ezi,`∼Fi [qi(zi,`,v−i)]
in terms of virtual values:
E
zi,`∼Fi
[q∗i (zi,`,v−i)]− E
zi,`∼Fi
[qi(zi,`,v−i)] = E
zi,`∼Fi
[ψi(zi,`)x
∗
i (zi,`,v−i)− ψi(zi,`)xi(zi,`,v−i)]
(105)
= E
zi,`∼Fi
[ψi(zi,`) (x
∗
i (zi,`,v−i)− xi(zi,`,v−i))] (106)
≤ E
zi,`∼Fi
[ψi(zi,`) ∆] (107)
∈ O(∆). (108)
Corollary A.2. The difference in total expected perceived payment when using x instead of
x∗ is O(n∆): i.e., |∑ni=1 Ev [q∗i (zi,`,v−i)− qi(zi,`,v−i)]| ∈ O(n∆).
En route to deriving the difference in total expected revenue from using allocation rule
x instead of x∗, we present the following lemma, which argues that the maximum difference
in perceived payment from bidder i is O(∆).
Lemma A.3. The difference in bidder i’s perceived payment when using allocation rule x
instead of x∗ is O(∆): i.e., |q∗i (zi,`,v−i)− qi(zi,`,v−i)| ∈ O(∆).
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume q∗i (zi,`,v−i) ≥ qi(zi,`,v−i). Allocation variables
x∗i (zi,`,v−i) and xi(zi,`,v−i) can differ by at most ∆, so the difference between q
∗
i (zi,`,v−i)
and qi(zi,`,v−i) is maximized when x∗i (zi,`,v−i) = xi(zi,`,v−i) + ∆, for an arbitrary value `,
and x∗i (zi,j,v−i) = xi(zi,j,v−i)−∆, for j < `. Now
q∗i (zi,`,v−i) =
(
zi,`x
∗
i (zi,`,v−i)−
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)x∗i (zi,j,v−i)
)
(109)
=
(
zi,`(xi(zi,`,v−i) + ∆)−
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)(xi(zi,j,v−i)−∆)
)
(110)
= zi,`(xi(zi,`,v−i)−
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xi(zi,j,v−i) + zi,`∆ +
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)∆
(111)
= qi(zi,`,v−i) + zi,`∆ +
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)∆ (112)
= qi(zi,`,v−i) + zi,`∆ + (zi,` − zi,1) ∆ (113)
= qi(zi,`,v−i) + ∆ (2zi,` − zi,1) (114)
= qi(zi,`,v−i) +O(∆). (115)
Therefore, the difference in perceived payments is O(∆).
43
A THE DISCRETIZATION EFFECT
Having established Lemma A.3, we now show that discretization affects the expected
revenue collected from bidder i by O
(√
∆
)
, and total expected revenue by O
(
n
√
∆
)
.
Lemma A.4. The difference in expected revenue from bidder i when using x instead of x∗
is O(
√
∆): i.e., |Ezi,`∼Fi [p∗i (zi,`,v−i)− pi(zi,`,v−i)]| ∈ O
(√
∆
)
.
Proof. First, we construct payment rules p¯ ∈ Rn and p˜ ∈ Rn. We choose p¯i(zi,`,v−i) and
p˜i(zi,`,v−i), for all i ∈ N and v ∈ T, so that
p¯i(zi,`,v−i) = min {p∗i (zi,`,v−i), pi(zi,`,v−i)} (116)
p˜i(zi,`,v−i) = max {p∗i (zi,`,v−i), pi(zi,`,v−i)} . (117)
Likewise, for q¯ , q˜ ∈ Rn.
By Jensen’s inequality, we can write the difference in expected revenue from bidder i as
E
zi,`∼Fi
[p∗i (zi,`,v−i)− pi(zi,`,v−i)] (118)
≤
(
E
zi,`∼Fi
[
(p∗i (zi,`,v−i)− pi(zi,`,v−i))2
])1/2
=
(
E
zi,`∼Fi
[
(p∗i (zi,`,v−i))
2 − 2p∗i (zi,`,v−i)pi(zi,`,v−i) + (pi(zi,`,v−i))2
])1/2
(119)
≤
(
2 E
zi,`∼Fi
[
(p˜i(zi,`,v−i))
2 − (p¯i(zi,`,v−i))2
] )1/2
, (120)
where Equation (120) follows from Equations (116) and (117) and
E
zi,`∼Fi
[
p¯i(zi,`,v−i)
2
] ≤ E
zi,`∼Fi
[p∗i (zi,`,v−i)pi(zi,`,v−i)] (121)
E
zi,`∼Fi
[
p˜i(zi,`,v−i)
2
] ≥ E
zi,`∼Fi
[
(p∗i (zi,`,v−i))
2] (122)
E
zi,`∼Fi
[
p˜i(zi,`,v−i)
2
] ≥ E
zi,`∼Fi
[
(pi(zi,`,v−i))
2] . (123)
Using Lemma A.3, we arrive at our result:(
2 E
zi,`∼Fi
[
(p˜i(zi,`,v−i))
2 − (p¯i(zi,`,v−i))2
])1/2
=
(
2 E
zi,`∼Fi
[q˜i(zi,`,v−i)− q¯i(zi,`,v−i)]
)1/2
(124)
≤
(
2 E
zi,`∼Fi
[|q∗i (zi,`,v−i)− qi(zi,`,v−i)|]
)1/2
(125)
≤
(
2 E
zi,`∼Fi
[O(∆)]
)1/2
(126)
∈ O
(√
∆
)
. (127)
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Corollary A.5. The difference in total expected revenue when using x instead of x∗ is
O
(
n
√
∆
)
: i.e., |∑ni=1 Ev [p∗i (zi,`,v−i)− pi(zi,`,v−i)]| ∈ O (n√∆).
To summarize, in our setting, where a budget B is finitely divisible by a factor ∆B, so
that allocations are multiplicative factors of ∆ = ∆B/B, in the usual linear case, where
qi = pi, total expected revenue is within O (n∆B/B) of optimal. Furthermore, in the case of
quadratic perceived payments, total revenue is within O
(
n
√
∆B/B
)
of optimal.
B Another Upper Bound
While non-operational as of yet, we present an easy-to-derive upper bound on revenue for
completeness.
Lemma B.1. Expected payments, when bidders have quasi-linear utility functions as de-
scribed by Equation (1) and qi(pi(zi,k,v−i)) = (pi(zi,k,v−i))
2, can be upper-bounded as fol-
lows: √
E
zi,k∼Fi
[ψi,k xi(zi,k,v−i)] ≥ E
zi,k∼Fi
[pi(zi,k,v−i)] . (128)
Proof. Applying Theorem 5.2 to concave utilities with qi(zi,k,v−i) = (pi(zi,k,v−i))2 yields:
E
zi,k∼Fi
[
(pi(zi,k,v−i))
2
]
= E
zi,k∼Fi
[ψi,k xi(zi,k,v−i)] .
By Jensen’s inequality (since squaring is a convex function):
E
zi,k∼Fi
[
(pi(zi,k,v−i))
2
] ≥ ( E
zi,k∼Fi
[pi(zi,k,v−i)]
)2
.
Combining the two equations and taking square roots completes the proof.
Example B.2. Following up on Example 5.5, we again assume Ti = {1}, for all bidders
i ∈ N , so that ψi,1 = 1. In this case, the upper bound (Equation (128)) is tight:
√
ψi,1 xi(vi,v−i) =
√
(1)
(
1
n
)
=
√
1
n
= pi(vi,v−i).
C Program Descriptions
We describe the programs implemented, including the number of variables and constraints.
Let k = maxi{Mi : i ∈ N}, so that k ≥Mi, for all bidders i ∈ N .
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C.1 RRM Mathematical Programs
C.1.1 RRM
Mathematical Program
max
x
∑
v
n∑
i=1
f(v)pi(v) (129)
subject to
n∑
i=1
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ T (130)
0 ≤ xi(v), ∀i ∈ N,∀v ∈ T (131)
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N,∀v ∈ T (132)
xi(zi,`,v−i) ≥ xi(zi,`−1,v−i), ∀i ∈ N,∀zi,` > zi,`−1 ∈ Ti,∀v−i ∈ T−i (133)
(pi(zi,`,v−i))
2 = zi,`xi(zi,`,v−i)− (134)
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xˆi(zi,j,v−i), ∀i ∈ N,∀zi,` ∈ Ti,∀v−i ∈ T−i
Variables For each bidder i ∈ N , and for each v ∈ T, there are variables xi(vi,v−i) and
pi(vi,v−i). The total number of variables is O(nkn).
Constraints The total number of constraints is O(nkn).
• Ex-post feasibility. This requires O(kn) equations.
• Lower and upper bounds on xi(vi,v−i). This requires O(nkn) equations.
• Monotonicity. There are O(kn−1) v−i vectors and O(k) comparisons per bidder; so
O(kn) equations per bidder, and O(nkn) equations in all.
• Payment formula. This requires O(nkn) equations.
C.1.2 RRM, Upper Bound (Pseudo-Surplus)
Mathematical Program
max
x
∑
v
n∑
i=1
f(v)
√
vixi(v) (135)
subject to
n∑
i=1
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ T (136)
0 ≤ xi(v), ∀i ∈ N, ∀v ∈ T (137)
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N, ∀v ∈ T (138)
xi(zi,`,v−i) ≥ xi(zi,`−1,v−i), ∀i ∈ N, ∀zi,` > zi,`−1 ∈ Ti,∀v−i ∈ T−i (139)
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Variables For each bidder i ∈ N and for each v ∈ T, there are variables xi(vi,v−i). The
total number of variables is O(nkn).
Constraints The total number of constraints is O(nkn).
• Ex-post feasibility. This requires O(kn) equations.
• Lower and upper bounds on xi(vi,v−i). This requires O(nkn) equations.
• Monotonicity. There are O(kn−1) v−i vectors and O(k) comparisons per bidder; so
O(kn) equations per bidder, and O(nkn) equations in all.
C.1.3 RRM, Lower Bound (Heuristic)
Mathematical Program
max
x
∑
v
n∑
i=1
f(v)
√
ψ+i (vi)xi(v) (140)
subject to
n∑
i=1
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ T (141)
0 ≤ xi(v), ∀i ∈ N, ∀v ∈ T (142)
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N, ∀v ∈ T (143)
xi(zi,`,v−i) ≥ xi(zi,`−1,v−i), ∀i ∈ N, ∀zi,` > zi,`−1 ∈ Ti,∀v−i ∈ T−i (144)
Variables For each bidder i ∈ N and for each v ∈ T, there are variables xi(vi,v−i). The
total number of variables is O(nkn).
Constraints The total number of constraints is O(nkn).
• Ex-post feasibility. This requires O(kn) equations.
• Lower and upper bounds on xi(vi,v−i). This requires O(nkn) equations.
• Monotonicity. There are O(kn−1) v−i vectors and O(k) comparisons per bidder; so
O(kn) equations per bidder, and O(nkn) equations in all.
C.2 BRM, Ex-post Mathematical Programs
C.2.1 BRM, Ex-post
This program does not use Equation (11) to compute payments. Instead, it attempts to
maximize revenue by relating qˆ and p terms.
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Mathematical Program
max
x
n∑
i=1
∑
vi∈Ti
fi(vi)pˆi(vi) (145)
subject to
n∑
i=1
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ T (146)
0 ≤ xi(v), ∀i ∈ N, ∀v ∈ T (147)
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N, ∀v ∈ T (148)
xˆi(vi) =
∑
v−i
f(v−i)xi(vi,v−i), ∀i ∈ N,∀vi ∈ Ti (149)
pˆi(vi) =
∑
v−i
f(v−i)pi(vi,v−i), ∀i ∈ N,∀vi ∈ Ti (150)
qˆi(vi) =
∑
v−i
f(v−i) (pi(vi,v−i))
2 , ∀i ∈ N,∀vi ∈ Ti (151)
xˆi(zi,`) ≥ xˆi(zi,`−1), ∀i ∈ N,∀zi,` > zi,`−1 ∈ Ti (152)
qˆi(zi,`) = zi,`xˆi(zi,`)− (153)
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xˆi(zi,j), ∀i ∈ N,∀zi,` ∈ Ti
Variables For each bidder i ∈ N , and for each vi ∈ Ti and v−i ∈ T−i, there are variables
pi(vi,v−i) and xi(vi,v−i). The total number of variables is O(nkn).
Constraints The total number of constraints is O(nkn).
• Ex-post feasibility. This requires O(kn) equations.
• Lower and upper bounds on xi(vi,v−i). This requires O(nkn) equations.
• Relating xˆi(vi) with xi(vi,v−i). This requires O(nk) equations.
• Relating pˆi(vi) with pi(vi,v−i). This requires O(nk) equations.
• Relating qˆi(vi) with (pi(vi,v−i))2. This requires O(nk) equations.
• Monotonicity. This requires O(nk) equations.
• Payment formula. This requires O(nk) equations.
C.2.2 BRM, Ex-post, Simplified
This program uses Equation (11) to compute payments.
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Mathematical Program
max
x
n∑
i=1
∑
vi∈Ti
fi(vi)hi(vi) (154)
subject to
n∑
i=1
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ T (155)
0 ≤ xi(v), ∀i ∈ N,∀v ∈ T (156)
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N,∀v ∈ T (157)
xˆi(vi) =
∑
v−i
f(v−i)xi(vi,v−i), ∀i ∈ N,∀vi ∈ Ti (158)
xˆi(zi,`) ≥ xˆi(zi,`−1), ∀i ∈ N,∀zi,` > zi,`−1 ∈ Ti
(159)
(hi(zi,`))
2 = zi,`xˆi(zi,`)−
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xˆi(zi,j), ∀i ∈ N,∀zi,` ∈ Ti (160)
Variables For each bidder i ∈ N , and for each vi ∈ Ti and v−i ∈ T−i, there are variables
xi(vi,v−i). The total number of variables is O(nkn).
Constraints The total number of constraints is O(nkn).
• Ex-post feasibility. This requires O(kn) equations.
• Lower and upper bounds on xi(vi,v−i). This requires O(nkn) equations.
• Relating xˆi(vi) with xi(vi,v−i). This requires O(nk) equations.
• Monotonicity. This requires O(nk) equations.
• Payment formula. This requires O(nk) equations.
C.2.3 BRM, Ex-post, Upper Bound (Pseudo-Surplus)
Mathematical Program
max
x
n∑
i=1
∑
vi∈Ti
fi(vi)
√
vixˆi(vi) (161)
subject to
n∑
i=1
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ T (162)
0 ≤ xi(v), ∀i ∈ N,∀v ∈ T (163)
xi(v) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N,∀v ∈ T (164)
xˆi(vi) =
∑
v−i
f−i(v−i)xi(vi,v−i), ∀i ∈ N, ∀vi ∈ Ti (165)
xˆi(zi,`) ≥ xˆi(zi,`−1), ∀i ∈ N, ∀zi,` > zi,`−1 ∈ Ti (166)
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Variables For each bidder i ∈ N and for each vi ∈ Ti and v−i ∈ T−i, there are variables
xi(vi,v−i). The total number of variables is O(nkn).
Constraints The total number of constraints is O(nkn).
• Ex-post feasibility. This requires O(kn) equations.
• Lower and upper bounds on xi(vi,v−i). This requires O(nkn) equations.
• Relating xˆi(vi) with xi(vi,v−i). This requires O(nk) equations.
• Monotonicity. This requires O(nk) equations.
Remark C.1. The BRM, ex-post, lower bound (heuristic) mathematical program has con-
straints that are identical to these, but differs in its objective function, which involves virtual
values instead of values:
max
x
n∑
i=1
∑
vi∈Ti
fi(vi)
√
ψ+i (vi) xˆi(vi) (167)
C.3 BRM Ex-ante Mathematical Programs
C.3.1 BRM, Ex-ante
Mathematical Program
max
x
n∑
i=1
∑
vi∈Ti
fi(vi)hi(vi) (168)
subject to
n∑
i=1
f(vi)xˆi(vi) ≤ 1 (169)
0 ≤ xˆi(vi), ∀i ∈ N,∀vi ∈ Ti (170)
xˆi(vi) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N,∀vi ∈ Ti (171)
xˆi(zi,`) ≥ xˆi(zi,`−1), ∀i ∈ N,∀zi,` > zi,`−1 ∈ Ti
(172)
(hi(zi,`))
2 = zi,`xˆi(zi,`)−
`−1∑
j=1
(zi,j+1 − zi,j)xˆi(zi,j), ∀i ∈ N,∀zi,` ∈ Ti (173)
Variables For each bidder i ∈ N , and for each vi ∈ Ti, there are variables xˆi(vi) and hi(vi).
The total number of variables is O(nk).
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Constraints The total number of constraints is O(nk).
• Ex-ante feasibility. This requires O(1) equations.
• Lower and upper bounds on xˆi(vi). This requires O(nk) equations.
• Monotonicity. This requires O(nk) equations.
• Payment formula. This requires O(nk) equations.
C.3.2 BRM, Ex-ante Relaxation
Mathematical Program
max
x
n∑
i=1
∑
vi∈Ti
fi(vi)
√
ψ+i (vi) xˆi(vi) (174)
subject to
n∑
i=1
f(vi)xˆi(vi) ≤ 1 (175)
0 ≤ xˆi(vi), ∀i ∈ N,∀vi ∈ Ti (176)
xˆi(zi,`) ≥ xˆi(zi,`−1), ∀i ∈ N,∀zi,` > zi,`−1 ∈ Ti (177)
Variables For each bidder i ∈ N , and for each vi ∈ Ti, there are variables xˆi(vi). The total
number of variables is O(nk).
Constraints The total number of constraints is O(nk).
• Ex-ante feasibility. This requires O(1) equations.
• Lower bounds on xˆi(vi). This requires O(nk) equations.
• Monotonicity. This requires O(nk) equations.
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